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RESTITUTION UNDER THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS: WHAT
CONSTITUTES A LEGAL BENEFIT*
LINDSEY R. JEANBLANCt
I. PERFORMANCE OF ORAL AGREEMENT AS LEGAL BENEFIT
1. INTRODUCTION
Although the original English Statute of Frauds" was enacted over two
hundred seventy years ago, its provisions, with minor variations, have been
adopted in virtually all of the states and territories of the United States.2
The amount of litigation concerning the Statute of Frauds continues to be
tremendous.' This study of restitution under the Statute4 involves an exami-
nation of the effect of the Statute of Frauds upon oral agreements which fail
to comply with its requirements; but we are not concerned with the problem
of determining what contracts must meet the requirements of the Statute to
be enforceable,5 or what constitutes a satisfaction of its provisions.,
* This article is one of a series submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of the Science of Law, in the Faculty of Law, Columbia
University.
t Professor of Law, Washington University, St. Louis, Mo.; A.B. 1935, J.D. 1937,
University of Illinois; LL.M. 1938, Columbia University.
1. 29 Car. II c. 3. It was passed and received the royal assent on April 16, 1677.
6 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 380-384 (1924); Costigan, The Date and
Authorship of the Statute of Frauds, 26 HARV. L. REv. 329-334 (1913).
2. See SMITH, THE LAW OF FRAUDS AND THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS c. 28-76 (1907),
for a collection of these statutes. Although most of them state, in effect, that "no action
shall be brought" on certain types of oral agreements, about one third of them provide
in substance that such agreements "shall be void."
3. The Century Digest lists approximately 6,300 cases under the Statute-of-Frauds
heading, the First Decennial approximately 2,200 cases, the Second Decennial approxi-
mately 2,300 cases, the Third Decennial approximately 3,150 cases, and the Fourth De-
cennial approximately 2,400 cases.
4. The expression of "restitution under the Statute of Frauds" is employed to describe
the situation wherein the parties entered into an oral agreement which did not comply
with the requirements of the Statute, and restitution is sought for the benefit conferred
in performance of or in reliance upon the unenforceable agreement.
5. For a discussion of the various classes of contracts which come within the opera-
tion of the Statute of Frauds see: 2 WmLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 449, 450 (rev. ed. 1936) ;
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 178 (1932) ; HARRIMAN, CONTRACTS §§ 595-605 (2d ed. 1901).
6. In the majority of jurisdictions the oral agreement may be taken outside the opera-
tion of the Statute of Frauds by partial performance. Many differences exist, however,
as to what acts are sufficient to constitute taking possession, making permanent im-
provements, or partial payment, some or all of which are the elements that constitute
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The oral agreement that does not satisfy the requirements of the Statute
of Frauds is sometimes referred to as void, 7 or voidable,8 but it is probably
more accurate to call it unenforceable. 9 The provisions of the Statute are
usually construed to prevent any action for the specific enforcement of the
defendant's promise in the oral agreement, as well as any action to recover
the monetary equivalent thereof as damages. In other words, the Statute of
Frauds is designed to deprive the plaintiff of any recovery which is based
upon his expectation interest-what he expected to obtain from the defendant
under the unenforceable agreement. The Statute may also prevent a recovery
by the plaintiff for losses sustained while relying upon the defendant's oral
partial performance. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS commentaries § 194 (1928) ; Moreland,
Statute of Frauds and Part Performance, 78 U. OF PA. L. REv. 51 (1929) ; Storke, Part
Performance and the Statute of Frauds in Colorado, 2 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 209 (1930) ;
Note, 17 MIcI. L. REv. 172 (1918); Note, 2 Wis. L. REv. 46 (1928). The underlying
principle by which the courts enforce the contract is "equitable fraud," which is injurious
reliance by the promissor rather than unjust enrichment of the promissee. 4 POmEROY,
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 3346 (4th ed. 1918-1919). Also see Asher, The Statute of Frauds
and Some Reasons for Taking an Oral Agreement Out of Its Operation, 18 Ky. L. J.
153 (1930) ; Cox, Partial Performance as Validating Parol Contracts for the Sale of
Lands, 6 TEx. L. REV. 50 (1927); Gay, Hardship as Taking a Parol Contract for the
Sale of Land Out of the Statute of Frauds, 2 TEX. L. REv. 347 (1924) (stating that hard-
ship alone is not sufficient) ; Pound, The Progress of the Law 1918-i9i9, 33 HARV. L. REv.
929, 933-950 (1920). If the Statute of Frauds is satisfied by partial performance, restitu-
tion is ordinarily unnecessary, but it may be available in case of total breach by the
promissor and incomllete performance by the promissee. RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS §
347 (1) (b) (1932). In Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, and Tennessee partial
performance does not satisfy the Statute of Frauds, and the vendee is allowed restitution
in lieu of specific performance. Wilhott, The Statute of Frauds and Part Performance
of Land Contracts in Kentuwky, 22 Ky. L. J. 434 (1934) ; Note, 1 N. C. L. REv. 48 (1922);
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS commentaries § 194 (1928).
As to the sufficiency of the written memorandum in satisfying the Statute of Frauds
see: 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 567-600 (rev. ed. 1936) ; Willis, The Statute of Frauds-
A Legal Anachronism, 3 IND. L. J. 528, 530-532 (1928) ; Kingsley, Some Comments on the
Section of the Minnesota Statute of Frauds Relating to Contracts, 14 MNN. L. RE v.
746, 757-760 (1930) ; Note, 20 CORN. L. Q. 226 (1935).
7. See Sutton v. Rowley, 44 Mich. 112, 113 (1880). Also see note 2 supra for statu-
tory provisions to the same effect.
8. See Chandler v. Wilder, 215 Ala. 209, 210, 110 So. 306 (1926) ; Luton v. Badham,
127 N. C. 96, 98, 37 S. E. 143, 144 (1900) ; City v. Manufacturing Co., 93 Tenn. 376, 379
(1893).
9. Corbin, Offer and Acceptance, and Some of the Resulting Legal Relations, 26
YALE L. J. 169, 180 (1917) says, "The term unenforcible (sic) contract includes both
void contracts and voidable contracts. It is customarily used so as to describe certain
other legal relations also. . . . When a contract is unenforcible (sic) by reason of the
statute of frauds, -either party has the legal power to create rights as against himself
(or to terminate his existing power of destroying the other's rights) by signing a mem-
orandum, but he has no such power to create rights in his own favor. In these cases a
legal relation exists that is different from that existing in the case of a void contract or
of a voidable one." Thus, as was said in in re Exeter Mfg. Co., 254 App. Div. 496, 497,
5 N. Y. S.2d 438, 439 (1938), "The statute of frauds here involved is not a ground at
law or in equity for the 'revocation' (i.e. the contract is not voidable) ; nor does it make
a contract within its purview void, but merely unenforcible." This view is generally
accepted. Note, 16 CORN. L. Q. 390, 396 (1931). Also see Lorenzen, The Statute of
Frauds and the Conflict of Laws, 32 YALE L. J. 311, 321-323 (1923).
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promise, providing such reliance action does not satisfy the requirements of
the Statute and thereby render the agreement enforceable," or does not confer
a benefit upon the defendant."1 But even though the acts of the parties in
entering into an oral agreement and in partially performing or acting in
reliance upon it may not justify a recovery on the contract for the expectation
or the reliance interests,' 2 it is possible that the same acts of the parties which
created the oral agreement together with their subsequent conduct may give
rise to an action based upon the restitution interest" (i.e., upon unjust enrich-
ment). For, if the plaintiff's action in reliance upon or in performance of the
oral agreement has conferred a benefit upon the defendant which is unjustly
retained, it would seem that the plaintiff's interest is one of restitution, and
most deserving of judicial protection. One writer expressed this idea in the
following language:
The 'restitution interest,' involving a combination of unjust im-
poverishment with unjust gain, presents the strongest case for relief.
If, following Aristotle, we regard the purpose of justice as the main-
tenance of an equilibrium of goods among members of society, the
restitution interest presents twice as strong a claim to judicial inter-
vention asthe reliance interest (or the expectation interest), since if
10. In Seymour v. Oelrichs, 156 Cal. 782, 106 Pac. 88 (1909), for example, A was
induced to resign from a "life time" position with a city in order to accept B's oral offer
for ten years of employment, and it was, understood that the oral agreement should be
reduced to writing. B's death prevented the execution of the writing. Later, B's heirs
breached the ten year agreement with A. In an action at law by A, however, they were
not allowed to rely on the Statute of Frauds. The court did not emphasize A's partial
performance, but rather his irrevocable change of position in reliance upon the subsidiary
promise to put the ten year agreement into writing.
11. See pp. 27, 28 infra.
12. Fuller and Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L. J.
52, 373 (1936) ; 10 TENN. L. RFv. 132 (1932) ; cf. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACrS § 90 (1932).
13. An analogous problem exists in the field of trusts. Stone, Resulting Trusts and
the Statute of Frauds, 6 COL. L. REv. 326, 336 (1906) says, "The plaintiff in the case of
a trust may assert either one of two distinct rights: one as the cestui que trust of an ex-
press trust created by the plaintiff's conveyance and parol declaration; the other in the
event that the defendant repudiates the trust, as cestui que trust of a constructive trust of
the property which in equity and good conscience should be restored to him, since the
defendant has repudiated his express obligation and taken shelter under the statute.
"That the remedy in each of the cases supposed is identical, determines nothing as to
the right asserted, nor does the fact that the bar of the statute prevents the assertion of
the right in the first case and the consequent recovery, bar the assertion of the right in the
second. It would certainly be a novel proposition to assert that a plaintiff in an action
in quasi contract brought to recover the value of his performance given under a contract
barred by the statute of frauds was enforcing the contract merely because it appeared
that the amount of recovery by way of'restitution in a given case happened to be the same
as the amount of damages for breach of contract ... " Also see Madden, Trusts and
the Statute of Frauds, 31 W. VA. L. Q. 166 (1925).
Cf. RESTATEMENT, CONTRAcTS § 1, comment c. (1932), which points out that the
word contract may refer to the acts which create the legal relation betv% een the parties, to
the writing which evidences those acts, or to the legal relations resulting from the opera-
tive acts. Thus, it would seem that even though a particular legal relation (i.e. an en-
forceable contract) was not created by the acts of the parties, the acts have occurred,
and may have relevance to another legal relation, namely, the duty to make restitution.
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A not only causes B to lose one unit but appropriates that unit to him-
self, the resulting discrepancy between A and B is not one unit but
two.'4
Since restitution merely requires the defendant to return the benefit con-
ferred upon and unjustly retained by him, it is a less drastic remedy (i.e., one
causing less net loss to the defendant) than one based solely upon the expecta-
tion or the reliance interests. Moreover, if restitution is sought by means of
perjured testimony, it would be necessary to falsify not only the existence of
the oral agreement, but also the plaintiff's subsequent performance thereof.
For these reasons the policy of the statute that prevents contractual actions
should not necessarily be applied to suits for restitution.15
In protecting the restitution interest, to what extent will the courts give
legal effect to the terms of the oral agreement or to the acts of the parties
which created it? In attempting to show that the defendant unjustly retained
a benefit or to establish the monetary amount of that benefit are the terms
of the oral agreement admissible for the purpose of proving that the defendant
requested the plaintiff's performance which would constitute the benefit?
May the terms of the unenforceable agreement be used to show that the
defendant promised return performance as an inducement to the plaintiff?
May they be employed to establish the nature, character, or value of the plain-
tiff's performance, or of the defendant's return performance? Are the terms
of the oral agreement admissible to provide an upper limit upon the amount of
the plaintiff's recovery? What effect is accorded to the terms of the oral
agreement if they are admissible? Are they merely evidence, prima facie
evidence, or conclusive evidence of the point to be established? Finally, even
though the terms of the unenforceable agreement are not admissible as such
for any of the above purposes, may some or all of the acts of the parties
which created the agreement be used in a suit for restitution as an admission
against interest or as an explanation of the subsequent conduct of the parties?
As, will be observed throughout this study, most of the courts have ad-
14. Fuller and Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L. J. 52,
56 (1936).
15. In this connection, it should be mentioned, the first drafts of the original English
Statute of Frauds provided that all agreements should be in writing "provided that this
act shall not extend to such actions . . . grounded upon . . . any quantum ineruit or any
other assumpsits or promises which are created by the construction or operation of
law . . ." The scope of the Statute was curtailed in committee and the above proviso,
being no longer needed in many of the sections, was eliminated from those paragraphs
of the final bill. See Hening, The Original Drafts of the Statute of Frauds (29 Car. II
c. 3) and Their Authors, 61 U. oF PA. L. REv. 283, 286, 305-307 (1913).
On the other hand, if restitution is sought under circumstances wherein there is a
particular likelihood of perjured testimony being used, such as under oral agreements
within the real estate brokers' statutes, courts generally find the retention by the defendant
is not unjust, and restitution is denied. This problem is discussed more fully in Jeanblanc,
Restitution Under the Statute of Frauds: What Constitutes an Unjust Retention, 48
Micn. L. REv. 923 (1950).
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mitted the terms of the oral agreement in evidence for at least some of the
purposes mentioned above; but there is considerable conflict as to the legal
effect of such agreements, especially in the cases which involve defaulting
plaintiffs and in those concerned with the measurement of the amount of
benefit conferred. The two groups of cases just mentioned are discussed in
other articles.16 The purpose of this article is to examine the benefit concept
as it operates in the cases of restitution under the Statute of Frauds.
2. PERORMANCE AS BENEFIT-IN GENERAL
Although a recovery in restitution is allowed only if both benefit and
unjustness exist,17 the controversy in some cases centers upon whether or not a
benefit exists,' while in other cases it is concerned with the relative unjust-
ness of the retention. 19 To obtain an understanding of restitution, the opera-
16. Jeanblanc, Restitution Under the Statute of Frauds: Measurement of the Legal
Benefit Unjustly Retained, 15 Mo. L. REv. 1 (1950) ; Jeanblanc, Restitution Under the
Statute of Frauds: What Constitutes an Unjust Retention, 48 MICH. L. Rav. 923 (1950).
17. RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 1 (1937) provides as follows: "A person who
has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required to make restitution to
the other." See also Patterson, The Scope of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, 1 Mo.
L. REv. 223 (1936) ; Seavey and Scott, Restitution, 54 L. Q. REv. 29 (1938) ; Winfield,
The American Restatement of the Law of Restitution, 54 L. Q. REv. 529 (1938).
The early cases involving restitution allowed the plaintiff to recover because the
defendant "in equity and good conscience" should not be permitted to retain that which
he had received. In Moses v. Macferlan, 2 Burr. 1005, 1012 (1760), Lord Mansfield said,
"In one word, the gist of this kind of action (money had and received) is, that the de-
fendant, upon the circumstances of the case, is obliged by the ties of natural justice and
equity to refund the money." See Bishop, Money Had and Received, An Equitable Ac-
tlion at Law, 7 So. CAL. L. REv. 41 (1933). Many of the courts and legal writers agree
with Mansfield's view, but some courts allow recovery upon the recognized fiction of an
implied promise by the defendant to pay for that which he received. This view is approved
by Holdsworth, Unjustified Enrichment, 55 L. Q. REv. 37 (1939). But see Winfield's
reply to Holdsworth in Note, 55 L. Q. REv. 161 (1939). Also see WINFIELD, THE PRO-
VINCE OF THE LAW OF TORTS 125 (1931) and JACKSON, HISTORY OF QUASI-CONTRACTS
IN ENGLISH LAW § 30 (1936). For a further examination of the basis for recovery in
restitution see Corbin, Quasi Contractual Obligations, 21 YALE L. J. 533 (1912).
Also see WOODWARD, QUASI CONTRACTS § 94 (1913). He expresses the view that
the basis of restitution is misreliance, but the cases apparently do not deny restitution to
one who confers a benefit while believing the oral agreement is unenforceable. Wood-
ward also points out that the general rule which denies restitiltion to one who confers a
benefit under mistake of law, is not applied in the state-of-frauds cases.
18. In Dowling v. McKenney, 124 Mass. 478 (1878), for example, the court's decision
in the defendant's favor was based upon the fact that the defendant rceived no benefit
from the plaintiff's labor in preparing a monument for delivery to the defendant. The
oral agreement provided that the defandant should convey land to the plaintiff in return
for the completed monument. The defendant's conduct in repudiating the oral agreement
before the monument was delivered to him seems to have been unjust, but he thereby
prevented the plaintiff from conferring a benefit upon him, and thus defeated the plain-
tiff's action for restitution.
19. In Hoagland Allum & Co. v. Allan-Norman Holding Corp., 228 App. Div. 133,
239 N. Y. Supp. 291 (1930), for example, the plaintiff loaned money to the defendant for
five years under an oral agreement whereby the latter was to pay off a mortgage held by
a third person on land that the defendant had purchased subject thereto. When the plain-
tiff sued to recover the money loaned, the defendant entered a counterclaim for the money
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tion of both benefit and unjustness, and the interaction of each upon the other
must be studied. Though realizing the difficulty of attempting to study one of
these concepts without at the same time considering the other, it is believed
that a clearer presentation can be achieved by first examining separately the
individual operation of each.
It is often assumed in restitution cases that benefit is an established term
with a definite meaning for all situations, but such is not the case. Since the
typical action for restitution in value, as distinguished from restitution in
specie, if successful, ends in a judgment for the payment of money, it is
necessary to find as a basis for the action a benefit of pecuniary value. To
the extent that a benefit cannot be expressed in terms of money, it is beyond
the scope of restitution in value as a means of legal redress. Hence there
is a suggestive parallel between the concept of "benefit" as used in restitution
in value cases and the term "value" as used in economics. But value is attrib-
uted to an article or service by economists, to a considerable extent, because of
its utility-its ability to satisfy human wants.2" Most economists feel that the
demand for an article or service in the market is merely a collection of the
wants of individuals, and the market value of that article or service, at least in
part, is a monetary expression of the extent to which the article or service
satisfies human desires. Since courts frequently employ the market value of
articles or services in determining and measuring the pecuniary amount of legal
benefit that the defendant derived from such items, it seems reasonable to infer
that the same principle of satisfaction of human wants underlies both legal
benefit in restitution and value in economics. If this is true, it would follow
that a legal benefit could also be found, even without the assistance of market
value, providing it can be shown objectively in money terms that the desires of
the individual defendant have been satisfied. The oral agreement, which
is unenforceable because of the Statute of Frauds, is frequently employed
to establish such an objective manifestation by the defendant.
A problem may arise as to whether or not the parties actually entered
into an oral agreement. But, it would seem to be difficult, at least in many
he had paid to the third party mortgagee under the terms of the oral agreement with the
plaintiff. The court held that neither the plaintiff's complaint nor the defendant's
counterclaim should be allowed. From the facts of this case it may be argued that the
plaintiff received a benefit from the money which the defendant paid to the third party
mortgagee in that the transaction requested by the plaintiff was carried out. The de-
fendant also received a benefit from the money advanced by the plaintiff, for even though
he passed it on to the third party mortgagee, his property was thereby cleared of an in-
cumbrance. Thus, as might be implied from the opinion of the dissenting judge, the
complaint and the counterclaim were both denied on the ground that neither the plaintiff
nor the defendant was unjustly retaining any benefit he had received from the other. For
a discussion of the various factors which enter into the determination of what constitutes
an unjust retention see Jeanblanc, Restitution Under the Statute of Frauds: What Con-
stitutes an Unjust Retention, 48 MICH. L. REv. 923 (1950).
20. For a good brief discussion see "Value and Price," 15 ENcYc. Soc. ScI. 218.
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cases, to explain the conduct of the plaintiff in rendering and the defendant
in accepting performance in the absence of some sort of a prior agreement.
And, if an agreement is found, it should be observed that the defendant's re-
quest in the agreement is for the particular type of performance which the
plaintiff rendered and for which restitution is sought. The defendant's request
not only eliminates any objection that the plaintiff was an officious inter-
meddler, but also serves as an admission by him that he regarded the plaintiff's
prospective performance as beneficial, at least at the time when the oral agree-
ment was formed. Since the unenforceable agreement also embodies the
defendant's promise of return performance as an inducement to the plaintiff,
it seems clear that the plaintiff did not intend to make a gift, but rather ex-
pected compensation for his performance. Finally, it will be noticed that the
defendant's request plus his promise of return performance in the oral agree-
ment shows, if there is no fraud on his part, that he expected to pay for the
plaintiff's performance of the unenforceable agreement. But, it may be
argued, the defendant merely expected to pay for complete performance of
the oral agreement, and to apply this principle to partial performance is to
assume not only that the partial performance confers a benefit upon the
defendant, but also that the defendant expected to pay the plaintiff for that
partial pefformance. Although this assumption may be true in many cases, the
delivery of an article that is usually sold in pairs, such as a shoe or a glove, may
furnish an example of possible exceptions. Again, however, the defendant's
conduct after the formation of the oral agreement is frequently such as to
establish that the plaintiff's partial performance was beneficial to him. Thus,
although the defendant's request and his promise of return performance are
present in many of the cases discussed in this article, their role in demonstrat-
ing that the defendant is retaining a legal benefit becomes more prominent as
the discussion progresses from types of performance by the plaintiff where
the legal benefit is more obvious to the cases where it is less obvious.
The cases collected in part I of this article involve action by the plaintiff
in response to an express request plus a promise of return performance by
the defaulting defendant, while the cases discussed in part II involve action
by the plaintiff in reliance upon the unenforceable agreement, but not in
response to any express request by the defaulting defendant. The divisions
are not air-tight compartments; for it is often difficult to determine when
the acts done by the plaintiff cease to be preparation for performance (i.e.,
merely reliance action) and become performance of the oral agreement
itself ;21 nevertheless, they do allow an examination of the benefit concept
as it operates upon different types of acts done by the plaintiff (e.g., where
the plaintiff parted with money, goods, land, or services). They also permit
21. See p. 30 infra.
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the cases to be arranged and discussed in the order of increasing difficulty in
obtaining a recovery. Further, they facilitate a comparison of the cases in
part I wherein a given type of action by the plaintiff in performance of the
oral agreement constitutes a legal benefit, with the cases in part II wherein
a different conclusion is often reached regarding the same type of action
merely rendered in reliance upon the unenforceable agreement.
3. PERFORMANCE AS BENEFIT-PLAINTIFF PARTED WITH MONEY
Ford v. Stroud2 illustrates a group of decisions wherein the plaintiff
transferred money to the defendant under the provisions of an oral agreement
that did not comply with the requirements of the Statute of Frauds. In that
case, after the defendant had defaulted by not perfecting his title to land that
he had orally promised to convey to the plaintiff, the latter sued to recover
the money paid to the defendant as part of the purchase price. A judgment
for the plaintiff was affirmed.
This result is universally accepted 23 and it has been reached irrespective
of the particular provision of the Statute of Frauds which has been violated
24
or of the character of return performance promised by the defendant. Thus
the plaintiff has been allowed to recover money paid under an unenforceable
agreement wherein the defaulting defendant had promised to convey land,2
22. 150 N. C. 362, 64 S. E. 1; 9 COL. L. REv. 561 (1909)..
23. 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 534, note 6 (rev. ed. 1936); cases cited notes 24-26
infra.
24. For cases allowing recovery of money paid under oral agreements in consideration
of marriage, see Glazebrook v. Glazebrook's Ex'r., 227 Ky. 628, 13 S.W.2d 776 (1929);
oral guaranty agreements, Rockett v. Edmundson, 164 Ala. 478, 51 So. 143 (1910) ; oral
agreements for sale of an interest in land, note 25 infra; oral agreements not performable
within one year, Swift v. Swift, 46 Cal. 267 (1873) ; Quinn v. Stark County Tele. Co.,
122 I1. App. 133 (1905) ; Weber v. Weber, 25 Ky. L. Rep. 908, 76 S. W. 507 (1903) ; De
Montague v. Bacharach, 187 Mass. 128, 72 N. E. 938 (1905) ; Van Schoyck v. Backus,
9 Hun 68 (N. Y. 1876) ; Butler v. Dinan, 65 Hun 620, 19 N. Y. Supp. 950 (1892) ; Hum-
mel v. Hummel, 133 Ohio St. 520, 14 N. E.2d 923 (1938); oral agreements within the
goods provision of the Statute of Frauds, see Stowe v. Fay Fruit Co., 90 Cal. App. 421,
265 Pac. 1042 (1928).
25. Dudley v. Hayward, 11 Fed. 543 (1882) ; Chandler v. Wilder, 215 Ala. 209, 110
So. 306 (1926) ; Littell v. Jones, 56 Ark. 139, 19 S. W. 497 (1892) ; Reynolds v. Harris,
9 Cal. 338 (1858) ; Dreier v. Sherwood, 77 Col. 539, 238 Pac. 38 (1925) ; Gilson v. Boston
Realty Co., 82 Conn. 383, 73 At]. 765 (1909) ; Mayer v. First Nat. Co., 99 Fla. 173, 125
So. 909 (1930) ; Dodgen v. Camp, 47 Ga. 328 (1872) ; Amonson v. Idaho Development
Co.. 25 Idaho 615, 139 Pac. 352 (1914) ; Collins v. Thayer, 74 Ill. 138 (1874) ; Barickman
v. Kuykendall, 6 Blackf. 21 (Ind. 1841); Frey v. Stangl, 148 Ia. 522, 125 N. W. 868
(1910) ; Robertson v. Talley, 84 Kan. 817, 115 Pac. 640 (1911) ; Zanone v. Tashgian, 231
Ky. 454, 21 S. W.2d 825 (1929) ; Purves v. Martin, 122 Me. 73, 118 Atl. 892 (1922) ;
Colonial Park Estates v. Massart, 112 Md. 648, 77 At]. 275 (1910); Cook v. Doggett,
2 Allen 439 (Mass. 1861) ; King v. Bird, 245 Mich. 93, 222 N. W. 183 (1928) ; Schultz v.
Thompson, 156 Minn. 357, 194 N. W. 884 (1923) (sub. nora. Schultz v. Johnson) ; Milan
v. Paxton, 160 Miss. .562, 134 So. 171 (1931) ; Devore v. Devore, 138 Mo. 181, 39 S. W.
68 (1897) ; Malone v. Romano, 95 N. J. Eq. 291, 127 Atl. 91 (1923) ; Marquat v. Marquat,
7 How. Pr. 417 (N. Y. 1853), rev'd on other grounds, 12 N. Y. 336 (1855) ; Grant v.
Brown, 212 N. C. 39, 192 S. E. 870 (1937); Welsh v. Welsh, 5 Ohio 425 (1832);
Schechinger v. Gault, 35 Okla. 416, 130 Pac. 305 (1913) ; Smith v. Dunn, 165 Ore. 418,
107 P.2d 985 (1940) ; Durham v. Wick, 210 Pa. 128, 59 At. 824 (1904) ; Miller v. Healey
39 R. I. 339, 97 Atl. 796 (1916) ; Vaughn v. Vaughn, 100 Tenn. 282, 45 S. W. 677 (1898) ;
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to deliver goods,26 or to repay money.
The plaintiff's performance, in parting with money, is already expressed
in the pecuniary terms employed by courts in the rendition of judgments, a
factor which facilitates the finding of a legal benefit. An economist also
regards money as beneficial, not so much for its ability directly to satisfy
human wants, but because its power as a medium of exchange enables the
recipient to obtain the various items or services that are capable of satisfying
his individual desires.
4. PERFORMANCE AS BENEFIT-PLAINTIFF PARTED WITH GOODS
If the plaintiff has delivered goods in return for the defendant's oral
promise to pay money, the agreement is generally enforceable, and restitution
under the statute of frauds is not involved. 2  But, if the defendant's oral
promise is to convey land in return for the plaintiff's goods,2 or if the oral
agreement cannot be performed within one year from the time of its forma-
Strickland v. Strickland, 276 S. W. 795 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925) ; Wekh v. Darling, 59 Vt.
136, 7 Atl. 547 (1886); Lewis v. Wisconsin Banking Commission, 225 Wis. 606, 275
N. W. 429 (1937).
26. In Stowe v. Fay Fruit Co., 90 Cal. App. 421, 265 Pac. 1042 (1928), the buyer
was allowed to recover in a cross complaint $250 paid for oranges under an oral agree-
ment that fell within the peculiarly worded California Statute of Frauds: Section 1624
(4) provided that "An agreement for the sale of goods, chattels or things in action, at a
price not less than two hundred dollars, unless the buyer accepts or receives part of such
goods and chattels, . . . or pays at the thne some part of the purchase money . . ."
(italics added), must be in writing. Thus the plaintiff's payment of $250 after the oral
agreement had been formed did not satisfy the quoted section of the California statute.
This section was changed however, in 1931 when California adopted the Uniform Sales
Act. See CALIF. CIV. CODE § 1624a (1941).
27. Swift v. Swift, 46 Cal. 267 (1873) (plaintiff was allowed to recover money
which the defendant had borrowed from him under an oral agreement obligating the de-
fendant to repay the money after the expiration of one year) ; Weber v. Weber, 25 Ky.
L. Rep. 908, 76 S. W. 507 (1903) ; cf. Salisbury v. Credit Service, 39 Del. 377, 199 Atl.
674 (1937) (plaintiff recovered money paid for bonds under an oral agreement whereby
the defendant was bound to repurchase them at the expiration of one year). It should
be noticed that these courts allowed recovery in restitution even though the result hap-
pened to be the same as though the oral agreement had been enforced. Also see the dis-
cussion of oral agreements to reconvey land, p. 12 infra.
28. Section 4 of the Uniform Sales Act, which has been enacted in 34 states, the
District of Columbia, and several territories, provides in part, "(1) A contract to sell
or a sale of any goods or choses in action of the value of five hundred dollars or upward
shall not be enforceable by action unless the buyer shall accept part of the goods or choses
in action so contracted to be sold or sold, and actually receive the same, or give some-
thing in earnest to bind the contract, or in part payment, or unless some note or memoran-
dum in writing of the contract or sale be signed by the party to be charged or his agent
in that behalf." Cf. Stowe v. Fay Fruit Co., 90 Cal. App. 421, 265 Pac. 1042 (1928).
29. Restitution under oral agreement that did not comply with the land provision of
the Statute of Frauds was allowed in the following cases: Singletary v. Ginn, 153 Miss.
700, 121 So. 820 (1929) ; Jelleff v. Hummell, 56 N. D. 512, 218 N. W. 227 (1928). Also
see cases cited note 34 infra.
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tion,30 the problem of restitution under the Statute of Frauds may be -raised
even though the goods provision of the Statute has been satisfied.31
To the extent that the goods parted with by the plaintiff are marketable,
they possess a power of exchange that enables the recipient to obtain money
which justifies the finding of a legal benefit.32 An economist would agree
that marketable goods possess value because of* their utility or ability to
satisfy human wants. The utility of the goods is reflected to a considerable
extent in the demand for the particular goods, which in turn frequently finds
expression in their market value. 3
As the marketability of the goods decreases, however, there is less justi-
fication in assuming that some one is ready and willing to pay money for the
goods received by the defendant, and it becomes more difficult to demonstrate
objectively, by means of market value, that the desires of the recipient have
been satisfied. But, if it is sufficiently evidenced by the defendant's ad-
missions or otherwise that his desires were satisfied by goods, even though
not readily marketable, the courts have correctly found that he was legally
benefited.
3 4
30. Restitution under oral agreement that did not comply with the one year provision
of the Statute of Frauds was allowed in the following cases: General Paint Corp. v.
Kramer, 68 F.2d 40 (10th Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 292 U. S. 623 (1934) ; Consolidated
Products Co. v. Blue Valley Creamery Co., 97 F.2d 23 (8th Cir. 1938) ; Winchester v.
Brown, 264 Mich. 421, 250 N. W. 277 (1933).
31. In David Taylor Co. v. Fansteel Products Corp., 234 App. Div.. 548, 255 N. Y.
Supp. 270 (1932), aff'd, 261 N. Y. 514, 185 N. E. 718 (1933), the oral agreement for sale
of ore was in excess of value allowed in the Sales Act, and not performable within one
year. Although part performance satisfied the Sales Act, the oral agreement was un-
enforceable under the one year provision. The plaintiff was allowed to recover in resti-
tution for the reasonable value of the ore delivered. Also see Note, 17 MINN. L. REv.
107 (1932).
32. The courts found a legal benefit had been conferred upon the defendants in each
of the following cases: Montague v. Garnett, 3 Bush 297 (Ky. 1867) (corn and pork
loaned for three years) ; Richards v. Allen, 17 Me. 296 (1840) (brick and oxen for land) ;
Dietrich v. Hoefelmeier, 128 Mich. 145, 87 N. W. 111 (1901) (parol agreement whereby
plaintiff parted with 20 sheep and defendant agreed to return 40 similar sheep at the end
of four years) ; Bennett v. Phelps, 12 Minn. 326 (1867) (oxen for land) ; Wyvell v.
Jones, 37 Minn. 68, 33 N. W. 43 (1887) (furniture for land); Devore v. Devore, 138
Mo. 181, 39 S. W. 68 (1897) (horse for land) ; Boyden v. Crane, 7 Alb. L. J. 203 (N. Y.
1873) (horse for land-abstract of decision) ; Miller v. Jones, 3 Head 525 (Tenn. 1859)
(wagon for land) ; McDonald v. Whaley, 244 S. W. 596 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922), modify-
ing 228 S. W. 313 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) (auto for land) ; Hawley v. Moody, 24 Vt. 603
(1852) (watch for oral lease) ; see Keath v. Patton, 2 Stew. 38, 41 (Ala. 1829) (horses
for land) ; Kieth v. Patton, 1 A. K. Marsh. 23, 24 (Ky. 1817) (horses for land);
Holbrook v. Armstrong, 10 Me. 31, 38 (1833) (plaintiff parted with six cows to be re-
turned or paid for at the end of two years if defendant was satisfied with a prior land
trade).
33. See note 20 suln'a.
34. Sears v. Ohler, 144 Ky. 473, 139 S. W. 759 (1911) ; Singletary v. Ginn, 153 Miss.
700, 121 So. 820 (1929) ; Wood v. Shultis, 4.Hun 309 (N. Y. 1875). In each of these
cases the plaintiff was allowed to recover the value of timber parted with under an oral
agreement which fell within the Statute of Frauds.
Booker v. Wolf, 195 Ill. 365, 63 N. E. 265 (1902) (stock of groceries for land)
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Legal benefits have also been found if the goods transferred to the de-
fendant were perishable,3- or intangibles such as patent rights,3 the relinquish-
ment of a claim,37 or even good will.3" Although the evidence of a legal'
benefit in such cases is perhaps less convincing than in those involving market-
able goods, the persuasiveness of the defendant's request and his promise of
return performance in showing that he got what he wanted is not diminished.
Albea v. Griffin, 2 Dev. & B. Eq. 9 (N. C. 1838) (goods for land) ; Jelleff v. Hummel,
56 N. D. 512, 218 N. W. 227 (1928) (stock of shoes for land) ; Chrisenberry v. Wylie,
54 S. W. 49 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1899) (stock of goods for land) ; see Winchester v. Brown,
264 Mich. 421, 423, 250 N. W. 277, 278 (1933) (equipment to operate a milk route, not to
be paid for within one year).
35. Consolidated Products Co. v. Blue Valley Creamery Co., 97 F.2d 23 (8th Cir.
1938). This case involved an oral agreement for the sale of buttermilk which was not
performable within one year. Although the court reversed a judgment in favor of the
plaintiff for the contract price (a'contract implied in fact), it intimated that the plaintiff
could recover the market value of the buttermilk delivered. Thus the court found a legal
benefit.
36. General Paint Corporation v. Kramer, 68 F.2d 40 (10th Cir. 1933), cert. denied,
292 U. S. 623 (1934) (assignment of patent rights to defaulting defendant under oral
agreement within Statute of Frauds was held to constitute a legal benefit) ; cf. Cohen v.
Stein, 61 Wis. 508, 21 N. W. 514 (1884) (plaintiff, who was employed as cloak designer
under an oral agreement not performable within one year, sought to recover for patterns
retained by defendant. Although the court did not deny that patterns would constitute a
legal benefit, they felt that the contract price, which the defendant had already paid, was
intended by the parties to include the value of the patterns).
37. In Sinclair Refining Co. v. Vaughn, 135 Kan. 82, 9 P.2d 995 (1932), Vaughn, a
manager of a gasoline depot for the company was wrongfully discharged for certain
shortages which were later traced to leaky storage tanks. Vaughn had also assigned cer-
tain claims to the company, and upon default of the obligors, Vaughn had reimbursed the
company. The Sinclair Company failed to reassign these claims to Vaughn. In settle-
ment of this dispute the parties entered into an oral agreement whereby Vaughn relin-
quished whatever rights he had against the company in return for the latter's promise
of continued employment for five years. Later the Sinclair Company repudiated this oral
agreement, and sued Vaughn for certain money which he had collected from the sale of
their products. Vaughn admitted in his answer that he held the company's money .as
alleged, but sought restitution for that which he had parted with under the oral agree-
ment. The finding of a legal benefit and verdict for Vaughn in the lower court was
affirmed upon appeal.
38. In Bethel v. Booth & Co., 115 Iy. 145, 72 S. W. 803 (1903), the plaintiff parted
with a store, consisting of $1,200 assets and considerable good will, in return for de-
fendant's oral promise of employment for ten years. The plaintiff sued for breach of
this agreement. The lower court gave a peremptory instruction to find for the defendant.
The appellate court reversed and remanded because they felt the defaulting defendant was
unjustly retaining a legal benefit, namely, "the difference between the amount paid for
the assets of the store which it (defendant) had purchased and its actual value on the
day the contract was made, and . . . for the loss which he sustained of the good will of
the business." One would not question the plaintiff's right to restitution for a stock of
goods parted with, minus the amount the defendant had paid thereon, and many would
agree that the good will of a business, when bargained for, might also constitute a legal
benefit to the defendant. But the court's suggestion, in the Bethel case, that the benefit
should be measured by the loss sustained by the plaintiff is certainly questionable. This
point is discussed more fully in Jeanblanc, Restitution Under the Statute of Frauds:
Measurement of the Legal Benefit Unjustly Retained, 15 Mo. L. REV. 1 (1950).
Although the court in Whipple v. Parker, 29 Mich. 369 (1874), did not exrpessly
mention good will, they allowed a recovery for an interest in a business which the plain-
tiff had parted with under an unenforceable agreement not performable within one year.
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In addition, and after the formation of the oral agreement, the defendant
accepted and retained the plaintiff's performance. Or if he consumed 9 or
dissipated such performance, his acts would add further to the evidence
which justified the above decisions that found a legal benefit was conferred.
5. PERFFORMANCE AS BENEFIT-PLAINTIFF PARTED WITn LAND
Many of the principles discussed in connection with the cases involving
goods are also applicable to the cases wherein the plaintiff parted with land
under the terms of an oral agreement that did not comply with the Statute
of Frauds. It takes a longer time and is perhaps more difficult to exchange
land for money than it is to exchange many types of gobds for money. The
assumption of a ready buyer, which is applicable in the case of marketable
goods, therefore, is less reliable when applied to land. Yet it is generally
conceded that the monetary value of the defendant's estate is enhanced by
the plaintiff's conveyance of the title to the land. Moreover, the plaintiff's
conveyance usually constituted full performance of his portion of the oral
agreement and, therefore, the defendant requested and promised return
performance for the exact and full performance which the plaintiff rendered.
Thus, the defendant got what he wanted and was legally benefited. Although
the transfer of title to the defendant should constitute a legal benefit in and
of itself, in most of the cases it is also followed by the defendant's taking
physical possession of the property. Such a manifestation by the defendant
after the formation of the oral agreement, and in addition to his request
and promise of return performance embodied therein, would seem to provide
a further justification for treating the land as a legal benefit.
In view of the fact that there was no common law count for land sold and
conveyed,4" and that land is unique in character, in many instances the plain-
ti'ff was allowed restitution in specie. 'Specific restitution of land is based
upon principles of constructive trusts and is sometimes allowed against a'
defaulting defendant who orally agreed to reconvey land to the plaintiff.41
39. In Crenshaw v. Bishop, 143 S. W. 284 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911), for example, the
owner of cattle was held to have received a legal benefit from having them fed and
pastured under an oral agreement that was not performable within one year. Similarly,
in Gifford v. Willard, 55 Vt. 36 (1883) board and lodging rendered under an oral agree-
ment within the land provision of the Statute of Frauds was held to constitute a legal
benefit.
40. RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION, Introductory note (1937).
41. A constructive trust will usually be imposed if the plaintiff has been fraudulently
induced to part with his land, or if a confidential relationship exists between the parties,
or if the land was conveyed under an absolute deed intended as security. In Young v.
Young, 251 Mass. 218, 146 N. E. 574 (1925) the plaintiff was allowed to recover land
conveyed to a defaulting defendant under an oral agreement to make mutual wills.
Where there is simply an oral agreement to reconvey, however, the decisions are
not in harmony. While the prevailing view in the United States is to deny the plaintiff
any relief, either for restitution in value or for restitution in specie on the ground that
relief in this situation would seem to "fly in the teeth" of the Statute of Frauds, the
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These decisions, which are similar to those wherein the plaintiff parted with
money or goods which the defendant orally agreed to return after one year,42
seem to "fly in the teeth" of the Statute of Frauds because the result is often
the same as though the action had been brought to enforce the oral agreement
itself. But, it is possible for a single set of facts to furnish a basis for two
separate causes of action.43 Professor Scott expressed this view as follows:
If the transferee were allowed to retain the land he would be unjustly
enriched; a constructive trust is imposed in order to prevent this un-
just enrichment. The Statute of Frauds prevents the courts from
enforcing the intention of the parties as such; it does not prevent
them from putting the parties in status quo. The statute forbids
going forward; it does not forbid going back. It is true that the
results of going forward and of going back may be, although they
will not necessarily be, the same, but that should not affect the
result. 44
In other situations where the plaintiff conveyed land, the courts have
held that the defendant was legally benefited irrespective of the particular
provision of the Statute that was violated, or of the character of return per-
plaintiff was allowed to recover the value of the land conveyed in the following cases:
Long v. Woodman, 65 Me. 56 (1875) (absolute deed intended as security) ; Peabody v.
Fellows, 177 Mass. 290, 58 N. E. 1019 (1901) (land for defendant's oral promise to pay
off mortgage and later reconvey); Cromwell v. Norton, 193 Mass. 291, 79 N. E. 433
(1906) (land for defendant's oral promise to reconvey if plaintiff returned from a
certain voyage). In Kemp v. Kemp, 248 Mass. 354, 142 N. E. 779, 780 (1924) (land for
oral promise of grantee to reconvey upon grantor's request), the court said, "Recovery
is allowed in such a case, not as an indirect way of enforcing the contract, which would
be contrary to sound principles, but on the ground that the refusal of the defendant to
perform constitutes a failure of consideration, and he is therefore bound to make the
plaintiff whole for what he has got from him."
In Whitaker v. Burrows, 71 Hun 478, 24 N. Y. Supp. 1011 (1893), the plaintiff
purchased land but had the title transferred to the defendant under an oral agreement
whereby the defendant provided the balance of the purchase price and promised to con-
vey to the plaintiff when she repaid the amount advanced. The defendant repudiated the
oral agreement and conveyed the land to a third party. Plaintiff was allowed to recover
the value of the land less his indebtedness to the defendant. In this connection attention
should be called to the statutes enacted in some states which abolish purchase-money re-.
sulting trusts. See 3 ScoTr, TRusTs § 440.2 (1939).
Most English courts would impose a constructive trust against the defaulting de-
fendant in these oral reconveyance agreements. The English view is generally preferred
by the legal writers: 1 ScoTT, TRUSTS §§ 41. - 44.4 (1939) ; 3 ScoTT, TRUSTS §§ 482-487
(1939) ; Stone, Resldting Trusts and the Statute of Frauds, 6 CoL. L. REv. 326 (1906) ;
Ames, Constructive Trusts Based lipon the Breach of an Express Oral Trust of Land,
20 HARv. L. REv. 549 (1907) ; Scott, Conveyances upon Trusts Not Properly Declared,
37 HARv. L. REv. 653 (1924) ; Costigan, Trusts Based on Oral Promises to Hold in Trust,
to Conevey, or to Devise, Made by Voluntary Grantees, 12 MicH. L. REv. 423, 515 (1914).
For a collection of authorities see Notes, 129 A.L.R. 689 (1940) ; 80 A.L.R. 195 (1932)
45 A.L.R. 851 (1926) ; 35 A.L.R. 280 (1925) ; 39 L.R.A. (n.s.) 906 (1912).
42. See note 27 supra and Montague v. Garnett, 3 Bush 297 (Ky. 1867).
43. This situation is illustrated by the cases which involve waiver of tort and suit in
assumpsit, by the tort liability of a doctor for carelessly performing his agreement to
operate, and by the tort liability of a minor for misrepresenting his age in order to induce
an adult to enter into a contract with him. Also see note 13 supra.
44. 1 Scorr, TRUSTS 247 (1939).
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formance promised by the defendant.4" Courts have also found legal benefits
when the plaintiff parted with an undivided interest in land,46 a right of
dower,4 or an easement of way48 in accordance with the terms of an oral
agreement that did not comply with the Statute of Frauds.
6. PERFORMANCE AS BENEFIT-PLAINTIFF RENDERED SERVICES
Many of the problems involved when the plaintiff seeks restitution for
services rendered in performance of an unenforceable agreement are presented
by Fabian v. Wasatch Orchard Company.49 The defendant had invested a
considerable sum of money in growing asparagus and was having difficulty
in finding markets for his products. He orally agreed to give the plaintiff
the exclusive right to sell his products in Utah and Southern Idaho for three
years with a 22 per cent commission on such sales, in return for which the
plaintiff orally promised to devote his entire time during the three year
period to introducing the defendant's products and creating markets for them.
Accordingly, the plaintiff secured over $30,000 worth of orders, and the
defendant accepted and filled more than one-half of these before he repudiated
the oral agreement. Although the defendant contended that he sustained a
loss in filling these orders, the appellate court correctly affirmed the plaintiff's
recovery of $2,300 on a quantum meruit count as the reasonable value of his
services.
The plaintiff's services in the Fabian case did not produce any tangible
article which the defendant retained at the time of the trial," but the plaintiff
may argue that his services enhanced the monetary value of the defendant's
45. Bethel v. Booth & Co., 115 Ky. 145, 72 S. W. 803 (1903) (store for $600 and
ten years employment); Dix v. Marcy, 116 Mass. 416 (1875) (land for mortgage to
guarantee support of grantor) ; O'Grady v. O'Grady, 162 Mass. 290, 38 N. E. 196 (1894)
(land for defendant's oral promise to pay off mortgage, to sell land, and to return balance
to plaintiff) ; Day v. New York Central Railroad Co., 51 N. Y. 583 (1882) (land for
right to feed cattle transported by the defendant railroad) ; Henning v. Miller, 83 Hun
403, 31 N. Y. Supp. 878 (1894) (land for defendant's oral promise to will one-third of
his estate to plaintiff). In the following cases the plaintiff parted with land in exchange
for defendant's oral promise to convey land: Stark's Heirs v. Cannady, 3 Litt. 399 (Ky.
1823) ; Bassett v. Bassett, 55 Me. 127 (1867) ; Basord v. Pearson, 9 Allen 387 (Mass.
1864); Miller v. Roberts, 169 Mass. 134, 47 N. E. 585 (1897) ; Nugent v. Teachout, 67
Mich. 571, 35 N. W. 254 (1867) ; Dickerson v. Mays, 60 Miss. 388 (1882) (cancellation
of deed) ; Thomas v. Dickinson, 14 Barb. 90 (N. Y. 1852) ; see Barr v. Davis, 82 Colo.
529, 261 Pac. 463, 464 (1927); Marcurda v. Fuller, 225 Mass. 341, 114 N. E. 366, 367
(1916).
46. Vick v. Vick, 126 N. C. 123, 35 S. E. 257 (1900).
47. Jarboe v. Severin, 85 Ind. 496 (1882) ; Andrews v. Broughton, 78 Mo. App. 179
(1899), 84 Mo. App. 640 (1900).
48. Thompson v. Madsen, 29 Utah 326, 81 Pac. 160 (1905).
49. 41 Utah 404, 125 Pac. 860 (1912), 61 U. OF PA. L. REv. 330 (1913), 26 MicH.
L. REv. 942 (1928).
50. An analogous situation results when the plaintiff parted with the use of an article
in performance of an oral agreement that did not comply with the Statute of Frauds.
See note 77 infra.
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estate (1) by creating good will from which the defendant would profit over
a period of years, (2) by creating or increasing the market value of the par-
ticular crop of asparagus that was sold, and (3) by saving the defendant's
estate from a pecuniary diminution in accordance with the defendant's request.
First, in view of the defendant's outlay in asparagus plants, the amount
of orders already obtained, and the number of years for which the plaintiff
was employed, it is probably fair to assume that at the time the oral agreement
was formed, and probably thereafter as well, the defendant contemplated that
the plaintiff's services would benefit him not only with respect to this par-
ticular crop, but also with respect to future crops. And the selling of $30,000
worth of a product at a reduced price would undoubtedly create at least some
good will for the business dealing in that product."
The defendant would probably insist that he was not unjustly retaining
any benefit, for he was forced to terminate his business long before he had
any opportunity to fully realize upon whatever good will was created by the
plaintiff's services. But in the case of Frazer v. Howe5 2 the plaintiff, who
received the exclusive right to sell the defendant's line for five years under an
oral agreement that did not comply with the Statute of Frauds was allowed
to recover for services rendered thereunder in developing markets for the
defendant's produce even though the defendant had sold his business to An-
other.5 3 A similar view is adopted in the analogous cases which involve restitu-
tion for partial performance under contracts that have become impossible of
further performance. In such cases the plaintiff is generally allowed to recover
the reasonable value of the services and materials parted with under the con-
tract, if they were of "benefit to the owner (defendant) in the advancement
of the ends to be promoted by the contract,"" even though they were destroyed
by the same event which rendered further performance of the contract im-
possible. Plaintiffs have obtained restitution for partial repairs to buildings" '
or chattels"0 which were destroyed without the fault of either party before the
repairs could be completed. Thus, if the plaintiff conferred a benefit upon
51. See cases cited note 38 supra.
52. 106 I1. 563 (1883). It is not clear from the report whether the defendant had
received anything for good will from the third person to whom the business had been sold.
53. In Cadman v. Markle, 76 Mich. 448, 43 N. W. 315 (1889), the plaintiff recovered
for services rendered in starting to organize electric companies under an oral agreement
not performable within one year, though the organization of some of these companies was
not completed. Cf. Laursen v. O'Brien, 90 F.2d 792 (7th Cir. 1937) (plaintiff recovered
for services rendered in developing invention under four year oral contract for royalties).
54. This language was used by the late Justice Cardozo in Buccini v. Paterno Const.
Co., 253 N. Y. 256, 170 N. E. 911 (1930), and it was later adopted in the RESTATEMENT,
CONTRACTS § 468 (3) (1932). For a further discussion of this problem and authorities
see WOOnWARD, QUASI CONTRACTS § 115 (1913) ; 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 1975, 1976
(rev. ed. 1938).
55. WOODWARD, QUASI CONTRACTS §§ 116-118 (1913).
56. Id. at § 119.
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the defendant, even though the latter's enjoyment of it was only temporary,
a legal benefit should be found and restitution allowed.
Second, the plaintiff might contend that his services conferred a legal
benefit upon the defendant with respect to the particular crop of asparagus
which he sold. The defendant insisted in the Fabian case, however, that the
services were not beneficial to him because the plaintiff sold the products
"for less than the cost of manufacturing them, and (they) were therefore
sold, not to the defendant's profit or gain, but to its loss. . . .117 In rejecting
the defendant's contention and pointing out its absurdity, the court gave the
following illustration:
If A should orally employ B to work on his farm for a term of three
years and agree to give him ten acres of land at the end of that
period, and if B, on the faith of the contract, should work . . . sow-
ing grain, and reaping crops, and A should then repudiate the contract
and refuse to longer engage B's services, . . . B could not recover
the reasonable value Qf his services; and if it were made to appear
that because of drought or falling market, or other causes not due
to his negligence or willfulness, the market price of the products was
less than the cost of production, then A received no benefit from B's
services, and the latter could not recover from the former."
The court's decision for the plaintiff was approved by one writer who said:
It is not easy to see the force of the argument that the plaintiff should
be paid only when the defendant makes a profit. That seems to be
deducting the unmarketability of the goods from the value of the
services.59
Although the cost of production, like demand, influences the future exchange
value of articles and might thereby ultimately affect the size of the defendant's
estate, the exchange value of the defendant's asparagus, which was already in
existence in the Fabian case and for which, according to the lower court, he
could find no ready market, could be determined only by whatever the defend-
ant could get for it, not by what it had cost him to produce it. Thus the ex-
change value of the defendant's existing crop of asparagus was at least in-
creased, if not created, by the plaintiff's services in developing markets under
the unenforceable agreement; and the defendant was thereby legally benefited.
Third, the plaintiff might contend that his services were beneficial to
the defendant in that they prevented him from sustaining as great a loss as
he would have suffered if they had not been rendered. In view of the facts
that asparagus is perishable, that the defendant had a large quantity on hand,
and that he was in an unfortunate financial condition, the defendant in the
Fabian case was forced to sell quickly or probably lose whatever exchange
value his asparagus possessed. Since the plaintiff's services, in obtaining over
$30,000 worth of orders, assisted the defendant materially in minimizing this
57. Fabian v. Wasatch Orchard Co., 41 Utah 404, 408, 125 Pac. 860, 861 (1912).
58. Ibid.
59. 61 U. oF PA. L. Rv. 330, 331 (1913).
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loss, it seems clear that the pecuniary value of the defendant's estate is larger
by reason of the plaintiff's services than it would have been if no such services
had been rendered. Moreover, the defendant requested and promised return
performance for the same type of services which were rendered by the
plaintiff under the unenforceable agreement. Thus, the defendant showed
that he wanted and was willing to pay for these services. Since the plaintiff's
services saved the defendant from having to pay another for rendering them,
it seems reasonable to conclude that such a saving should constitute a legal
benefit.
This view has been adopted by a large number of cases,6" of which'
Grantham v. Granthavzi3 ' is typical. The oral agreement in that case required
the plaintiff to care for his mother in return for her verbal promise to will her
personal and real property to him. The mother's will failed to provide for the
plaintiff, but he was allowed to recover the reasonable value of the services he
had rendered at the testatrix's request and in accordance with the terms of the
unenforceable agreement. The decisions, that the plaintiff's services should
constitute a legal benefit in situations like the Grantham case, are justified
because the services were rendered it; performance of the oral agreement and
saved the defendant's estate from a pecuniary diminution which probably
would have been suffered if the services had been secured elsewhere. Thus,
the great majority of the courts have held that services rendered in perform-
ance of an unenforceable agreement constitute a legal benefit irrespective of
the character of the return performance promised by the defendant.6 2
60. The following cases allowed the plaintiff to recover for services rendered (usually
in caring for the deceased) in return for the decedent's promise to will real estate .to
the plaintiff: Quirk v. Bank of Commerce & Trust Co., 244 Fed. 682 (6th Cir. 1917) ;
Bonner v. Sledd, 158 Ark. 47, 249 S. W. 556 (1923) ; Long v. Rumsey, 12 Cal.2d 334, 84
P.2d 146 (1938) ; Hull v. Thorns, 82 Conn. 647, 74 Atl. 925 (1910) ; Watson v. Watson,
1 Houst. 209 (Del. 1856); Hensley v. Hilton, 191 -Ind. 309, 131 N. E. 38 (1921);
Haralambo's Adm'r. v. Christopher, 231 Ky. 550, 21 S. W.2d 983 (1929), 18 IKY. L. 3.
396 (1930) ; Segars v. Segars, 71 Me. 530 (1880) ; Hamilton v. Thirston, 93 Md. 213, 48
Atl. 709 (1901) ; Dixon v. Lamson, 242 Mass. 129, 136 N. E. 346 (1922) ; lit re Williams,
106 Mich. 490, 64 N. WN. 490 (1895) ; Carter v. Witherspoon, 156 Miss. 597, 126 So. 388
(1929); Gupton v. Gupton, 47 Mo. 37 (1870); Willette v. Whitney, 82 N. H. 209, 131
Atl. 597 (1926) ; McCarty v. Ennist, 7 N. 3. Misc. 558, 146 Atl. 653 (1929) ; Lisk v.
Sherman, 25 Barb. 433 (N. Y. 1857) ; Grantham v. Grantham, 205 N. C. 363, 171 S. E.
331 (1933) ; Richter v. Derby, 135 Ore. 400, 295 Pac. 457 (1931) ; Riddle v. George, 181
S. C. 360, 187 S. E. 524 (1936); Goodloe v. Gpodloe, 116 Tenn. 252, 92 S. W. 767;
Moore v. Rice, 110 S. W.2d 973 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937); In re Goyk's Estate, 216 Wis.
462, 257 N. W. 448 (1935) ; see Burns v. McCormick, 233 N. Y. 230, 135 N. E. 273 (1922),
32 YALE L. J. 89 (1922).
61. 205 N. C. 363, 171 S. E. 331 (1933).
62. Laursen v. O'Brien, 90 F.2d 792 (7th Cir. 1937) (services in developing inven-
tion under oral four year agreement for royalties) ; Franklin v. Matoa Gold. Min. Co.,
158 Fed. 941 (8th Cir. 1907) (legal services for corporate stock in violation of the goods
provision of the Statute of Frauds) ; Farrow v. Burns, 18 Ala. App. 350, 92 So. 236 (1922)
(services as deputy sheriff for over one year) ; Patten v. Hicks, 43 Cal. 509 (1872)
(cutting logs for two years) ; Mills v. joiner, 20 Fla. 479 (1884) (seventeen years of
service for land) ; Seder v. Grand Lodge, 35 Idaho 277, 206 Pac. 1052 (1922) (soliciting
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The defaulting defendant may also be willing to pay for services which
he feels will restore his health, or afford him pleasure, such as the playing of
music or the rendering of some other type of entertainment. If the defendant
orally agrees to make such a payment and the plaintiff renders some or all
of the services required by the terms of the unenforceable agreement, thereby
saving the defendant from having to pay someone else for those services, it is
submitted, that the defendant is legally benefited.
7. PERFORMANCE AS BENEFIT-PLAINTIFF IM PROVED LAND
Here we must distinguish the more common cases in which improvements
were made, not in performance of an oral agreement, but in reliance upon it.G
3
In a considerable number of cases, however, the improvements were made in
performance of the agreement and thus at the defendant's request. Blank v.
of lodge members for over one year) ; Quinn v. Stark County Tele. Co., 122 Ill. App.
133 (1905) (services in return for twenty years of telephone service) ; Schoonover v.
Vachon, 121 Ind. 3, 22 N. E. 777 (1889) (services for land) ; Hahnel v. Highland Park
College, 171 Iowa 492, 152 N. W. 571 (1915) (music teacher for one year) ; Longhofer v.
Herbel, 83 Kan. 278, 111 Pac. 483 (1910) (services in consideration of marriage) ; Stout's
Adm'r. v. Royston, 32 Ky. L. Rep. 1055, 107 S. V. 784 (1908) (support for land) ; Chap-
man v. Rich, 63 Me. 588 (1874) (support for three years of service) ; Donovan v. Walsh,
238 Mass. 356, 130 N. E. 841 (1921) (services for land) ; Kutzner v. Stuart, 215 Mich.
270, 183 N. V. 905 (1921) (five years of farm work in return for share in profits);
Oxborough v. St. Martin, 169 Minn. 72, 210 N. W. 854 (1926), 27 COL. L. ]ZEV. 337
(1927) ; 40 HARV. L.'REv. 648 (1927) (attorney's services for one half of the land re-
covered) ; Dalgarno v. Holloway, 56 Mont. 561, 186 Pac. 332 (1919) (digging ditch for
interest in land) ; Riiff v. Riibe, 68 Neb. 543, 94 N. W. 517 (1903) (services for over one
year) ; Howe v. Day, 58 N. H. 516 (1879) (support for land) ; Lapham v. Osborne, 20
Nev. 168, 18 Pac. 881 (1888) (counterclaim for services for over one year) ; King v.
Brown, 2 Hill 485 (N. Y. 1842) (services for land) ; Price v. Askins, 212 N. C. 583, 194
S. E. 284 (1937) (support for land) ; Towsley v. Moore, 30 Ohio St. 184 (1876) (services
for over one year) ; Morris Plan Co. v. Campbell, 180 Okla. 11, 67 P.2d 52 (1937) (serv-
ices for over one year) ; Jackson v. Stearns, 58 Ore. 57, 113 Pac. 30 (1911) (attorney's
services for land) ; Ewing v. Thompson, 66 Pa. St. 382 (1870) (nursing services for
land) ; Carter v. Brown, 3 S. C. 298 (1871) (services as cotton overseer for over one
year in return for 16 bales of cotton) ; A. W. Kutsche & Co. v. Hot Blast Coal Co., 84
S. V.2d 371 (Tenn. App. 1935), 14 TENN. L. REV. 124 (1936) (services in building fence
in return for old fence, not performable within one year) ; Gray v. Cheatham, 52 S. W.2d
762 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) (support for land) ; Fabian v. Wasatch Orchard Co., 41 Utah
404, 125 Pac. 860 (1912), 26 MIcH. L. REV. 942 (1928) ; 61 U. OF PA. L. REV. 330 (1913) :
Sheldon v. Preva, 57 Vt. 263 (1884) (clearing land for timber cut, not performable
within one year) ; Weaver v. General Metals Merger, 167 Wash. 451, 9 P.2d 778 (1932)
(services for two years) ; Nelson v. Christensen, 169 Wis. 373, 172 N. V. 741 (1919)
(services for house and lot).
For a discussion of one group of cases, however, wherein the plaintiff has been de-
nied a quantum meruit as well as a contractual recovery for services rendered under an
oral agreement which did not comply with the real estate broker's Statute of Frauds, see
Jeanblanc, Restitution Under the Statute of Frauds: What Constitutes an Unjust Reten-
tion, 48 MIcH. L. REV. 923 (1950). A representative case is Hale v. Kreisel, 194 Wis.
271, 215 N. W. 227 (1927), 12 MARQ. L. REV. 81, 4 Wis. L. REV. 379 (1928). For a
collection of authorities see Note, 56 A.L.R. 783 (1928). Also see Notes, 6 MINN. L. REV.
167 (1922) ; 31 YALE L. J. 447 (1922).
63. See p. 27 infra.
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RogCrs,0 4 for example, involved improvements which the plaintiff made upon
the defendant's larid in accordance with the terms of an oral agreement, un-
enforceable because of the Statute of Frauds, by which the defendant promised
to lease the land to the plaintiff. In finding that these improvements con-
stituted a legal benefit, the court said:
• . . the complaint here avers that it was part of the oral agreement
that the plaintiff should do the very things for which he seeks com-
pensation. From the declarations of the complaint there is thus a
showing of an unjust enrichment of the defendant at the expense of
the plaintiff, . . . "
Under such circumstances, the majority of the courts have found that such
improvements constitute a legal benefit,6" whether they were made under an
oral lease of the defendant's property for longer than one year17 or under an
oral agreement wherein the defendant promised to sell the land to the plain-
tiff."s In either event the improvements were made in response to the de-
fendant's request, and in the absence of an agreement for severance they
became the property of the defendant land owner when they were affixed
to the realty. In one case, however, the plaintiff was denied restitution even
against a defaulting defendant so long as he remained in possession of the realty.
Possibly this decision was reached because the plaintiff was still enjoying
whatever benefit could be presently derived from the improvements ;60 yet
the ownership of the improvements should constitute a legal benefit to the
defendant. A better explanation of such a holding is that the plaintiff acted
64. 82 Cal. App. 35, 255 Pac. 235 (1927).
65. Id. at 37, 255 Pac. at 238. Interstate Hotel Co. v. Woodward & Burgess Amuse-
ment Co., 103 Mo. App. 198, 77 S. W. 114 (1903) involved analogous facts and reached
a similar result. Also see WOODWARD, QuAsi CONTRACTS §§ 102, 107 (1913).
66. Although the earlier cases allowed recovery only in equity, this limitation is oS
little significance today in the light of the many codes of procedure whidh minimize the
distinctions between actions at law and suits in equity. KEENER, QUASI CONTRACTS 363-373
(1895) ; 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 537 (rev. ed. 1936) ; WOODWARD, QUASI CONTRACTS
§ 102 (1913) ; Note, 17 A.L.R. 949 (1922).
67. Crane v. Franklin, 17 Ariz. 476, 154 Pac. 1036 (1916); Blank v. Rodgers, 82
Cal. App. 35, 255 Pac. 235 (1927) ; People's National Bk. v. Magruder, 77 Fla. 235, 81
So. 440 (1919) ; Brashear v. Rabenstein, 71 Kan. 455, 80 Pac. 950 (1905) ; Williams v.
Bemis, 108 Mass. 91 (1871) ; Parker v. Tainter, 123 Mass. 185 (1877) ; Interstate Hotel
Co. v. Woodward & Burgess Amusement Co., 103 Mo. App. 198, 77 S. W. 114 (1903) ;
Winter v. Spradling, 163 Mo. App. 77, 145 S. W. 834 (1912) ; Rosepaugh v. Vrenden-
burgh, 16 Hun 60 (N. Y. 1878) ; Nastrom v. Sederlin, 43 Wyo. 330, 3 P.2d 82 (1931).
68. King v. Thompson, 9 Pet. 204 (U. S. 1835) ; Allen v. Young, 88 Ala. 338, 6 So.
747 (1889) ; Cozad v. Elam, 115 Mo. App. 136, 91 S. W. 434 (1905) ; Graham v. Graham,
134 App. Div. 777, 119 N. Y. Supp. -1013 (1909) ; Luron v. Badham, 127 N. C. 96, 37
S. E. 143 (1900); Ebert v. Disher, 216 N. C. 36, 3 S. E.2d 301 (1939), rehearing denied,
216 N. C. 546, 5 S. E.2d 716 (1939) ; Love v. Burton, 61 S. W. 91 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1900).
69. Miller v. Tobie, 41 N. H. 84 (1860). Also see WOODWARD, QUASI CONTRACTS
163 (1913).
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inequitably by retaining possession, so there was an absence of an unjust
retention by the defendant rather than an absence of a legal benefit.7 °
Improvements illustrate the many ways in which several types of per-
formance can be combined in a single case. The improvement cases resemble
the goods cases7 1 in that the defendant is usually retaining something tangible
at the time of the trial; they also resemble the service cases72 in that the
improvements are usually so affixed to the land that they cannot be returned
to the plaintiff.73 Hence specific restitution would be impracticable and unjust
to both parties; to the plaintiff because the salvaged materials would not equal
the benefit he had conferred; to the defendant because the salvage operation
would interfere with his use of the land. Specific restitution of improvements
would also involve economic waste of labor and materials.
These peculiar characteristics of improvements sometimes raise the
problem of whether the existence of a legal benefit should be determined by
examining the monetary enlargement of the defendant's estate, or the
pecuniary loss which the defendant would have suffered if the improvements
had been obtained from someone else. In many cases either course would
disclose the existence of a legal benefit, but, where it was economically unwise
to make the improvements or they merely adapted the defendant's property
to the peculiar use of the plaintiff, no legal benefit could be found if the
enhancement test alone were employed. Since the defendant's request and
his promise of return performance is present in the improvment cases the
same as it is present in the cases of goods 74 and services,75 it would seem that
the performance improvements, which are really only a combination of goods
and services, should constitute a legal benefit whether they save from diminu-
tion or enhance the monetary value of the defendant's estate. The defendant
is held liable for what he would have had to pay someone else (in the market)
to make the improvements which he requested the plaintiff to make.
70
8. PERFORMANCE AS BENEFIT-PLAINTIFF PARTED WITH USE OF LAND
77
The distinction between performance of an oral agreement and mere reli-
ance upon it must also be emphasized here.78 For the plaintiff who orally
70. See Jeanblanc, Restitution Under the Statute of Frauds: What Constitutes Unjust
Retention, 48 MicaI. L. REv. 923 (1950).
71. See p. 9 supra.
72. See p. 14 supra.
73. Parenthetically, many statutes have been enacted concerning recovery for this
type of benefit. See MARTIN, CASES ON CONVEYANCES 285-288 (1939).
74. See p. 9 supra.
75. See p. 14 supra.
76. Cf. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 347 (1932).
77. While there are no cases squarely in point, it would seem that the use of money
or of a chattel received by the promissor from the promissee under an unenforceable oral
promise would also constitute a legal benefit.
78. See p. 18 supra.
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agreed to sell his land to the defendant parts with the use of his land merely
in reliance upon the oral agreement, while the plaintiff who orally agreed to
lease his land to the defendant for longer than one year usually parts with the
use of his land in performance of the terms of the oral agreement itself .7 '
In the use of land cases, as in those involving services, and improve-
ments, the plaintiff cannot be specifically restored to the status quo. Many of
the principles discussed in connection with the cases of services8" and im-
provements,"' therefore, are also applicable here. Although the cases are
unanimous in allowing the plaintiff to recover from a defaulting defendant
for the latter's use of land under the terms of an oral lease,8 2 they do not
clearly show whether their results are based upon principles of landlord and
tenant or upon principles of restitution. In this connection, Professor Wood-
ward said:
The obligation is not strictly quasi contractual, but is incidental to the
relation of landlord and tenant created by the lessee's occupancy of
the land in subordination to the lessor's title and with the lessor's con-
sent. Although the lease is said to be void or unenforceable, the terms
of the lessee's obligation for use and occupation, including the amount
payable and the time for payment, are governed exclusively by its
provisions, . . . In substance and effect this amounts to a partial
enforcement of the oral lease. 3
In view of the facts that the defendant accepted the use of the plaintiff's
land after the formation of the oral agreement, that the defendant's estate
was at least saved from a pecuniary diminution, if not enhanced, and that the
defendant, by his express request and promise of return performance, con-
sented to lessen the pecuniary value of his estate in exchange for the use
and occupation of the plaintiff's land, it is submitted that such use of land
should constitute a legal benefit and that the decisions mentioned above"
could also be supported by the principles of restitution.
79. See p. 29 infra.
80. See p. 14 supra.
81. See p. 18 supra.
82. Walsh v. Colelough, 56 Fed. 778 (7th Cir. 1893); Smith v. Pritchett, 98 Ala.
649, 13 So. 569 (1893) ; Crawford v. Jones, 54 Ala. 459 (1875) ; Nelson v. Webb, 54 Ala.
436 (1875) ; Parker v. Hollis, 50 Ala. 411 (1874) ; Crommelin v. Thiess & Co., 31 Ala.
412 (1858); Davidson v. Ernest, 7 Ala. 817 (1845) ; Hays v. Goree, 4 Stew. & P. 170
(Ala. 1833) ; Walker v. Shackelford, 49 Ark. 503, 5 S. W. 887 (1887) ; Warner v. Hale,
65 111. 395 (1872) ; Smith v. Kinkaid, 1 Ill. App. 620 (1878) ; Wolke v. Fleming, 103 Ind.
105, 2 N. E. 325 (1885) ; Nash v. Berkmeir, 83 Ind. 536 (1882) ; Steele v. Anheuser-Busch
Brewing Ass'n., 57 Minn. 18, 58 N. W. 685 (1894); Evans v. Wonona Lumber Co., 30
Minn. 515, 16 N. W. 404 (1883); Aylor v. Mclnturf, 184 Mo. App. 691, 171 S. W. 606
(1914) ; Talamo v. Spitzmiller, 120 N. Y. 37, 23 N. E. 980 (1890) ; Laughran v. Smith,
75 N. Y. 205 (1878) ; Herrmann v. Curiel, 3 App. Div. 511, 38 N. Y. Supp. 343 (1896) ;
Robb v. San Antonio St. R., 82 Tex. 392, 18 S. W. 707 (1891) ; Brooke-Smith Realty Co.
v. Graham, 258 S. W. 513 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
83. WOODWARD, QuAsi CONTRACTS 152 (1913).
84. See cases cited note 82 supra. Also see discussion pp. 24, 25 in~fra.
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9. PERFORMANCE AS BENEFIT-BENEFIT RENDERED TO A THIRD PARTY
Even before the enactment of the Statute of Frauds, it was established
that A's delivery of goods to C at B's request would render B liable in an
action of debt, an action which always proceeded upon the assumption that
the defendant (B) had received somethiig.8 5 Indeed, B's desires were
satisfied by A's performance and this is properly held to constitute a legal
benefit to B.
In Clement v. Rowe 6 the defendant induced the plaintiff to convey land
to a corporation of which the defendant was secretary, in return for which the
corporation issued stock to the plaintiff. The defendant-secretary had orally
promised to repurchase the stock if seven per cent dividends were not paid
by the corporation for the next two years. The corporation paid no dividends,
and after the expiration of the two years the plaintiff tendered the stock to
the defendant and demanded that he repurchase it at the orally agreed price.
The defendant repudiated the oral agreement which did not comply with the
one year provision of the Statute of Frauds, and the plaintiff then brought
this action to recover the value of the land he had conveyed. In affirming
the trial court's decision to set aside a directed verdict for the defendant and
grant a new trial, the court said:
In the present case the defendant, himself, did not receive the land
which was the partial consideration for the invalid promise, it went
to the Medicine Company. But it went to the Medicine Company at
the direction of the defendant. So far as the relations between the
plaintiff and the defendant are concerned, the situation was the same
as though the land really became the property of the defendant, but
by his direction the title was taken in the name of a third person.
In such a case the law will presume that the benefit of the transaction
inured to the defendant.
8 7
On the other hand, some courts have denied recovery when the plaintiff's
performance under the oral agreement was rendered to a third party at the
defendant's request."' The recent case of Rotea v. Izuel,80 is a good illustra-
85. The Lady Shandois v. Simson, Cro. Eliz. 880 (Q. B. 1602). The plaintiff de-
clared in debt for £256 for embroidery placed upon a gown for the servant of the de-
fendant's daughter, and a judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed. Also see JACKSON,
THE HISTORY OF QUASI CONTRACT IN ENGLISH LAW § 13 (1936).
86. 33 S. D. 499, 146 N. W. 700 (1914). And in Moody v. Smith, 70 N. Y. 598
(1877), the defendant orally agreed to convey land to the plaintiff in return for services
which the plaintiff was to render to a third party. The court held that the defendant had
received a legal benefit. Also see Hubbard v. Hubbard, 151 App. Div. 174, 175, 135 N. Y.
Supp. 908, 910 (1912).
87. Clement v. Rowe, 33 S. D. 499, 507, 146 N. W. 700, 702 (1914).
88. In Gazzam v. Simpson, 114 Fed. 71 (2d Cir. 1902), the plaintiff and the defend-
ant together held the majority of stock in a certain corporation. They entered into an
oral agreement which was within the one-year provision of the Statute of Frauds. The
defendant agreed to keep the plaintiff in control of the corporation, in return for which
the plaintiff loaned money to the corporation. The court said, "It is quite impossible to
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tion. The plaintiff sued an executor for services he had rendered to the
deceased's sister under an oral agreement whereby the deceased promised to
devise real estate to the plaintiff. The court found that the defendant had
received no legal benefit, and said:
The services here were admittedly performed with respect to and
for the direct benefit of Eugenia Izuel, the sister of the deceased. In
other words, said services were not performed with respect to or for
the direct benefit of the deceased or with respect to or for the direct
benefit of any person to whom the deceased owed a legal duty of
support. Defendant therefore contends that the plaintiff may not re-
cover . . . upon an obligation implied in law as the law will not
imply an obligation from the mere fact that the deceased may have
requested plaintiff to perform services for a third person. In our
opinion this contention must be sustained.90
define or ascertain the pecuniary value to any stockholder or creditor accruing from a
loan received by the corporation." Id. at 72. The court held that the defendant had re-
ceived no legal benefit and affirmed the ruling of the trial judge in directing a verdict for
the defendant. In Kimmins v. Oldham, 27 W. Va. 258 (1885), for the protection of a
corporation of which both the plaintiff and the defendant were stockholders, a promissory
note was signed by the plaintiff as maker and the defendant as indorser. The plaintiff
and the defendant had entered into an oral agreement which was within the one-year pro-
vision of the Statute of Frauds. It provided that if the corporation should not pay the
note, then any loss should be divided equally. When the note matured the plaintiff paid it
in full, and sought to recover from the defendant in restitution, but the court held that
such payment inured to the benefit of the corporation, not to the defendant-stockholder.
In Pierce v. Estate of Paine, 28 Vt. 34 (1855), the plaintiff purchased corporate stock
in performance of an oral agreement with the defendant which was not performable with-
in one year. The oral agreement provided that the defendant was to purchase the stock
from the plaintiff at the end of one year, if the plaintiff so desired. The court held that
the plaintiff's payments to the corporation for the stock which he had received did not
constitute a legal benefit to the defendant. The writer believes, as stated in the text, that
these decisions are not sound.
In Bristol v. Sutton, 115 Mich. 365, 73 N. W. 424 (1897) an uncle orally promised
his fifteen-year-old nephew one thousand dollars if the latter, who had been emancipated,
would return to his father's home and work there until he reached majority. After the
uncle's death, the nephew filed a claim against the uncle's estate for the services he had
rendered to his father under the oral agreement. The court found that the uncle had
received no legal benefit from the nephew's services. Perhaps the decision can be ex-
plained on its peculiar facts. It will be observed that restitution was sought for services
rendered by the son to his father while the son was in fact still a minor. The court may
have been motivated also by the danger of collusion between the plaintiff and his father
to falsify the existence of an oral agreement in order to obtain a portion of the uncle's
estate.
89. 14 Cal.2d 605, 95 P.2d 927 (1939). The decision has been criticized in Note, 28
CALIF. L. REv. 528 (1940).
90. Rotea v. Izuel, 14 Cal.2d 605, 610, 95 P.2d 927, 930 (1939). Cf. Dunphy v. Ryan,
116 U. S. 491 (1885). In that case plaintiff sued defendant on a note. Defendant filed
a counterclaim that plaintiff had repudiated an oral agreement wherein defendant bought
land from a third person in return for plaintiff's promise to buy a 1/3 interest therein.
In holding the counterclaim was bad the court said, "The defendant paid no money to or
for the plaintiff. The money paid out by him was to enable him to perform the contract
with the plaintiff. He paid it out himself and for his own advantage. The plaintiff re-
ceived neither the money nor the land from the defendant." (Italics added). Id. at 497.
If a defendant has not in fact requested and promised return performance for the plain-
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It is believed that the court overlooked the vital fact that the defendant had
done -more than merely request the plaintiff to perform for the third party.
He had also made a return promise whereby, in the absence of fraud, he
showed his willingness to diminish the monetary value of his estate in ex-
change for the very performance which the plaintiff rendered. Perhaps the
deceased intended to make a gift of the plaintiff's services to the sister, but
at any rate the sister received services from the plaintiff which she would not
have received except for the defendant's request and promise of return per-
formance. It is submitted, therefore, that the Rotea case and others in accord
with it are wrongly decided.
10. PERFORMANCE AS BENEFIT-SOME INTANGIBLE BENEFITS
The benefit conferred upon a third party at the defendant's request,91
like all benefit, is intangible in one sense. But the benefit to be discussed in
this section is characterized by a peculiar lack of direct enjoyment by the
defendant.
In Mdtousek v. QUirici92 the plaintiff agreed to lease his store to the
defendant under an oral agreement that did not comply with the Statute of
Frauds. Even though the defendant never actually occupied the store under
this agreement, the plaintiff was allowed to recover the reasonable value for
use and occupation. Since the evidence showed that the defendant leased the
store for the express purpose of keeping competitors from occupying the
property, the defendant received the same benefit that he contemplated at the
time the oral agreement was formed. The presumed existence of competitors
who were willing to lease the store shows that the absence of occupancy by
others was a benefit to the defendant and a satisfaction of his desires. While
the gain to the defendant may have been only a lessening of competition, he
may be properly held to pay for it what he would have had to pay anyone
else, namely, the "market" rental value of the premises.
The Matousek case should be compared with Huey v. Frank93 which was
decided by the same court two years earlier. In that case the plaintiff was
allowed to recover from the defaulting defendant who had not occupied the
rooms, the amount which the plaintiff-lessor had expended "at the special
instance and request of the defendant" 94 under an oral agreement, for
tiff's conduct, as the language concerning the counterclaim in the Dunphy case would
seem to imply, then the plaintiff's conduct is merely reliance action rendered in prepara-
tion for performance of the oral agreement. See discussion p. 30 infra.
91. The Lady Shandois v. Simson, Cro. Eliz. 880 (Q. B. 1602).
92. 195 Ill. App. 391 (1915) ; cf. Barlow v. Wainwright, 22 Vt. 88, (1849).
93. 182 IIl. App. 431 (1913).
94. Id. at 435, the court said: "It is well settled that while in an action at law a
party cannot recover on a contract within the statute of frauds he may recover for money
paid, property delivered, or services rendered in accordance with, and upon the faith of
such a contract. . . . The proof shows that these several amounts (for lettering, for
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window lettering, shades, and telephone services. The plaintiff's perform-
ance merely adapted his property to the use of the defendant and probably
did not increase its sale or rental value. Neither did the plaintiff's performance
enhance the monetary value of the defendant's estate, except for the possible
benefit the defendant-lessee might have received from the advertisement on
the lettered windows. This was not the type of benefit, and was probably
merely an incident to the benefit the defendant contemplated when he entered
into the oral agreement. It was not the benefit upon which the court based
the plaintiff's recovery. The legal benefit" to the defendant was found in that
the plaintiff had conducted himself in accordance with the defendant's request
and in expectation of the defendant's return performance as expressed in the
oral agreement. In view of the presence of the defendant's request, his promise
of 'return performance, and the pecuniary saving to the defendant's estate
in his not having to do what the plaintiff did, which he could not have enjoyed
if he had secured the requested performance elsewhere, it is submitted that the
court in the Huey case was justified in finding that the defendant had received
a legal benefit.
In Kearns v. Andree" the parties entered into an oral agreement for the
sale of a lot upon which the plaintiff-vendor was completing a new house.
Later the defendant became dissatisfied with his purchase, but "finally agreed
to stand by the bargain, if certain alterations were made in the house, if it was
finished in a certain way, and if certain trees standing upon the lot were cut
down. ' "9 The plaintiff complied with the defendant's requests, which actually
rendered the property less saleable, but the defendant again refused to com-
plete the purchase. After repainting the house and repapering certain rooms
in order to secure another purchaser,.the plaintiff sued to recover the expendi-
tures incurred in complying with the defendant's requests and also for those
required to obtain the subsequent purchaser. The oral agreement was held
unenforceable because the provisions regarding a mortgage which was to be
placed on the lot were to indefinite. But the court drew an analogy to the
service cases involving'restitution under the Statute of Frauds" and, after
setting aside the lower court's judgment which allowed recovery for the
repainting and repapering necessary to obtain the ultimate purchaser as well
as for the work done at the defendant's request, the court said:
window shades; and for telephone services), aggregating $38.40, were paid out by plaintiff
in error at the special instance and request of defendant in error. To deny to plaintiff
in error a judgment for this amount would be to permit defendant in error to pervert the
statute of frauds into an instrument of fraud." (Italics added).
95. 107 Conn. 181, 139 Atl. 695 (1928). Also see Notes, 44 HARV. L. REv. 623 (1931);
26 MicH. L. REv. 942 (1928); 13 MiNN. L. Rav. 71 (1928).
96. Kearns v. Andrea, 107 Conn. 181, 183, 139 At. 695, 696 (1928).
97. Id. at 187, 139 AtI. at 697.
25 '
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But if the work done on the property to adapt it to the desires of the
defendant was done under the terms of an oral agreement for the sale
of the premises, in good faith and in the honest belief that the agree-
ment was sufficiently definite to be enforced, the plaintiff is entitled
to recover the reasonable compensation therefor. 9s
The character of the plaintiff's conduct and the results therefrom (i.e.,
the absence of monetary enrichment to the defendant) in the Kearns case are
similar to those in the Huey and Vlatousek cases. But in the Huey and
Matousek cases the defendant's request was made as a part of the oral agree-
ment and was accompanied by the defendant's promise of return performance,
while in the Kearns case the defendant's request was made after he had repudi-
ated a prior unenforceable agreement. Nevertheless, the parties apparently
agreed to disregard their prior agreement in the Kearns case, and the plain-
tiff's performance was actually rendered in exchange for the defendant's
subsequent promise to purchase the land, and not merely in reliance upon it.
Since the plaintiff in the Kearns case rendered performance upon his own
property to prepare it for conveyance to the defendant, this case will be
considered again in connection with the cases involving reliance action in
preparation for performance."9 .
IT. ACTION IN RELIANCE1 ° ° UPON ORAL AGREEMENT AS LEGAL BENEFIT
11. RELIANCE ACTION AS BENEFIT-IN GENERAL
A suit to obtain compensation for the plaintiff's action rendered in reli-
ance upon, rather than in performance of the oral agreement that did not com-
ply with the Statute of Frauds, frequently involves a situation wherein the
plaintiff suffered a loss without conferring a corresponding benefit upon the
defendant. It may be argued, on other grounds than the principles of
restitution,1"' that this type of loss by the plaintiff is one which should be
shifted to the defaulting defendant. But we are concerned with the extent to
which restitution can alleviate the harsh results sometimes produced by the
Statute of Frauds. More specifically, our problem is to ascertain what types
of reliance action, if any, should constitute a legal benefit.
98. Id. at 188, 139 Atl. at 698. Also see Note, 59 A.L.R. 604 (1929), for a discussion
of this case.
99. See pp. 33, 37 infra.
100. The plaintiff's performance in the cases discussed in part I of this article may
also be said to have been rendered in reliance upon the oral agreement which did not
comply with the provisions of the Statute of Frauds. But the heading "Action in Re-
liance" is employed here to differentiate between the plaintiff's reliance action in part
II, which is rendered without any request by the defendant and the plaintiff's perf6rmance
in part I which was bargained for, and rendered in response to such a request and in ex-
change for a promise of return performance. "Performance" implies a duty to perform,
whereas "reliance action" does not.
101. See note 147 infra.
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When the defendant entered into the oral agreement, he robably con-
templated that some acts would be done by the plaintiff in reliance thereon,
but this does not mean that he foresaw, much less desired the same reliance
action which was later rendered. In that event some mention of it would
probably have been made in the oral agreement. Nevertheless, the reliance
action was not rendered in response to the defendant's request and promise
of return performance. From the absence of any request it is inferred that,
at the time when the oral agreement was formed, the defendant did not expect
to pay the plaintiff anything for the acts rendered in reliance upon the oral
agreement.
It is also probable, in many instances, that the plaintiff did not expect
anything from the defendant in return for his reliance action. The plaintiff
may have made improvements upon the defendant's land in reliance upon
the latter's oral promise to convey that land to the former. It seems reasonable
to conclude that, at least when the improvements were being made, the plain-
tiff intended to retain them for his own benefit and did not expect anything
from'the defendant therefor. A further illustration is afforded when the
plaintiff's reliance action consists of preparation for his own performance of
the oral agreement. Although the plaintiff does ultimately expect something
in return for his reliance action, he does not expect anything until it has
progressed far enough to constitute performance of the oral agreement itself.
On the other hand, as was discussed in Part I of this article, when the plaintiff
renders performance of the oral agreement, he does so in response to the de-
fendant's request and in expectation of the return performance promised by
the defendant.
12. RELIANCE AS BENEFIT-PLAINTIFF IMPROVED LAND
Improvements may constitute a legal benefit to the defendant land owner
if they enhance the pecuniary value of his estate, but if they merely save him
from paying another for making them, it must be shown that the defendant,
wanted the improvements made. As was discussed earlier,"0 2 improvements
made by a vendee or lessee in performance of an unenforceable agreement
may confer a legal benefit upon the land owner in either of the above ways.
But since reliance improvements are neither requested by the defendant nor
induced by his promise of return performance, it is not established that the
defendant wanted the improvements or would have paid another to make
them. Reliance improvements may constitute a legal benefit to the defendant,
however, if they enhance the pecuniary value of his estate, even though he did
not request them. When the improvements are affixed to the land so as to
102. See p. 18 sitpra.
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become a part thereof,"0 " the title to them passes to the land owner, and if
the saleable value of his land is increased thereby,"° his power to obtain things
that satisfy his desires is also increased. In order to determine whether or not
the improvements have become sufficiently annexed to the land so the title
to them passed to the defaulting defendant, tests from the field of fixtures
must be employed. If the title to the fixtures has not passed to the defendant,
then the problem is one preparatory reliance.'0 I
As was pointed out elsewhere,0 specific restitution of improvements
upon land is usually impractical, but it would seem that the land could be
reached by the plaintiff in equity as security for his claim in restitution. The
Restatement of Restitution suggests that an equitable lien should arise,0 7 and
some of the cases have so held.0 8 There are also many other cases holding
that improvements made in reliance upon an unenforceable agreement to
lease.00 or to purchase the land"0 constitute a legal benefit to the extent that
they increased the salable value of the land.
103. But in Goodwin v. Perkins, 134 Cal. 564, 66 Pac.'793 (1901), the improvements
were not affixed to the land so as to be regarded as a part thereof. The title to them re-
mained in the plaintiff-lessee, and he was allowed to remove them.
104. In recognition of this principle the court in Carter v. Carter, 182 N. C. 186, 190,
108 S. E. 765, 766 (1921) approved the following language: "The general rule is that if
one is induced to improve land under a promise to convey the same to him, which promise
is void or voidable, and after the improvements are made he refuses to convey, the party
thus disappointed shall have the benefit of the improvements to the extent that they
increased the value of the land." And see Bendix v. Ross, 205 Wis. 581, 585, 238 N. W.
381, 382 (1931), for similar language. Note, 8 Wis. L. Rv. 87 (1932).
105. See p. 30 infra.
106. See p. 19 supra.
107. RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 161, comment a (1937), provides: "... Thus,
where a person makes improvements upon the land of another under circumstances which
entitle him to restitution, he may have an equitable lien upon the land, but he cannot
charge the owner of the land as constructive trustee .of the land for him and compel the
owner to transfer the land to him (see § 170; compare § 206). . ...
108. In the following cases the plaintiffs were unable to obtain specific performance
of the unenforceable promise to sell the land, but were allowed a lien for the improve-
ments made in reliance upon the oral agreement. Jones v. Gainer., 157 Ala. 218, 47 So.
142 (1908) ; Williams v. Williams, 210 Ala. 372, 98 So. 200 (1923) ; Johnston v. Glancy,
4 Blackf. 94 (Ind. 1835) ; Brown v. East, 5 B. Mon. 405 (Ky. 1827) ; Ballamy v. Rags-
dale, 14 B. Mon. 293 (Ky. 1853) ; Treece v. Treece, 73 Tenn. 220 (1880).
The recovery for the improvements was also accompanied by a lien in the following
cases: Bush v. Sullivan, 3 G. Greene 344 (Iowa 1851) ; Dedman v. Nally, 14 Ky. L. Rep.
229 (1892) ; see Poole v. Johnson, 31 Ky. L. Rep. 168, 170, 101 S. W. 955, 956 (1907).
A lien has also been granted to defendant's for improvements they made in reliance
upon the unenforceable agreement when the plaintiff land owner is trying to regain pos-
session of the land. Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Cordon, 208 N. C. 723, 182 S. E. 496
(1935) ; Padgett v. Decker, 145 Ky. 227, 140 S. W. 152 (1911) ; see Crain v. Crain, 197
Ky. 813, 814, 248 S. WV. 176, 177 (1923).
109. The following courts have found that reliance improvements constituted a legal
benefit to the land owner: Findley v. Wilson, 3 Litt. 390 (Ky. 1823) ; Smith v. Kober,
108 Neb. 768, 189 N. W. 377 (1922) ; Gregory v. Peabody, 149 Wash. 227, 270 Pac. 825
(1928), aff'd, 153 Wash. 99, 279 Pac. 102 (1930) ; see Ingram v. Corbit, 177 N. C. 318,
322, 99 S. E. 18, 20 (1919).
110. The earlier cases allowed the plaintiff to recover only in equity. McCracken v.
Sanders, 4 Bibb 511 (Ky. 1817) ; Orear v. Botts, 3 B. Mon. 360 (Ky..1843) ; Welsh v.
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13. RELIANCE ACTION AS BENEFIT-PLAINTIFF PARTED WITH USE OF LAND
The cases involving the use and occupation of land parted with in per-
formance of the terms of an oral lease which did not comply with the Statute
of Frauds were discussed above."' On the other hand, if the plaintiff orally
promised to sell his land to the defendant and allowed the latter to take
possession, the use and occupation is then parted with in reliance upon rather
than in performance of the oral agreement.
The plaintiff did not expect anything in return for his reliance action as
such, though he did expect something, in return for the performance of his
promise to convey the land, which was presumably sufficient to include the
value of the use and occupation enjoyed by the defendant as a result of the
plaintiff's reliance upon the oral agreement. Hence, it is not to be inferred
that the plaintiff intended to make a gift to the defendant of the use and
occupation of the land. It would seem, even in the absence of a request by
the defendant, that he was legally benefited by the use and occupation if the
pecuniary value of his estate was thereby enlarged.
Welsh, 5 Ohio 425 (1832) ; Mathews v. Davis, 25 Tenn. 324 (1845). In Perry v. Norton,
182 N. C. 585, 588, 109 S. E. 641, 643 (1921) the court said, "It is doubtful whether,
prior to the abolitions of the distinctions between actions at law and suits in equity, an
action could have been maintained at law for compensation for improvements put upon
land by the vendee. The court of equity had granted relief by enjoining the eviction of
the vendee by the vendor, who repudiated his contract until he had made compensation
for improvements. Whatever difficulty was encountered because of technical rules of
pleading disappear when forms of action are abolished. . . ." Also see Note, 17 A.L.R.
951 (1922) ; 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 537 (rev. ed. 1936).
Reliance improvements were held to constitute a legal benefit to the land owner in
each of the following cases: Williams v. Williams, 210 Ala. 372, 98 So. 200 (1923);
Wainwright v. Talcott, 60 Conn. 43, 22 Atl. 484 (1891) ; Johnston v. Glancy, 4 Blackf. 94
(Ind. 1835) ; Dunn v. Winans, 106 Kan. 80, 186 Pac. 748 (1920) ; Padgett v. Decker, 145
Ky. 227, 140 S. W. 152 (1911) ; Bishop v. Clark, 82 Me. 532, 20 Atl. 88 (1890) ; Hille-
brands v. Nibbelink, 40 Mich. 646 (1879); Schultz v. Thompson, 156 Minn. 357, 194
N. W. 884 (1923) (sub norm. Schultz v. Johnson) ; Smith v. Smith's Adm'rs, 28 N. J. L.
208 (1860) ; Harris v. Frink, 49 N. Y. 24 (1872) ; Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Gordon,
208 N. C. 723, 182 S. E. 496 (1935) ; Holthouse v. Rynd, 155 Pa. St. 43, 25 AtI. 760
(1893) ; Smoot v.. Smoot, 80 Tenn. 274 (1883) ; Burleson v. Tinnin, 100 S. W. 350 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1907) ; Muckle v. Hoffman, 119 Wash. 519, 205 Pac. 1048 (1925) ; Bendix v.
Ross, 205 Wis. 581, 238 N. W. 381 (1931), 8 WXs. L. REv. 87 (1932) ; see Sims v. Mc-
Ewen's Adm'r., 27 Ala. 184, 192 (1855) ; McNamee v. Withers, 37 Md. 171, 177 (1872) ;
Hillis v. Rhodes, 205 Mo. App. 439, 450, 223 S. W. 972, 974 (1920) ; Faircloth v. Kinlaw,
165 N. C. 228, 231, 81 S. E. 299, 300 (1914) ; Duke v. Griffith, 13 Utah 361, 372, 45 Pac.
276, 278 (1896) ; Porter v. Shaffer, 147 Va. 921, 933, 133 S. E. 614, 617 (1926) ; ef.
McCracken v. McCracken, 88 N. C. 272 (1883) (plaintiff was not allowed to recover for
improvements made when defendant denied the existence of the oral agreement to sell) ;
Often v. Stout, 97 N. J. Eq. 122, 127 Atl. 677 (1925) (vendee was not allowed to recover
for improvements made after vendor had repudiated the oral agreement) ; Holthouse v.
Rynd, 155 Pa. St. 43, 25 Atl. 760 (1893) (vendor indicated his willingness to stand by
the oral agreement after he had repudiated it, and the court allowed the vendee to recover
for improvements made after the repudiation). Also see Note, 17 A.L.R. 949 (1922);
and 2 WILLISTON, CONTRAcTs § 537 (rev. ed. 1936).
111. See p. 20 supra.
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Although Ames pointed out that the remedy of assumpsit for use and
occupation was created by statute rather than by judicial decisions, and that
the courts were reluctant to extend it to situations not mentioned in the Act
of Parliament,"' a few courts have allowed the land owner to recover in
assumpsit for use and occupation of land parted with in reliance upon the
oral agreement."' Many other decisions have also recognized that the reli-
ance use and occupation constitutes a legal benefit and have allowed it to
be set off against the vendee's claim for improvements made upon the
property.
14
14. RELIANCE ACTION AS BENEFIT-PLAINTIFF PREPARED
TO PERFORM ORAL AGREEMENT-IN GENERAL
, Preparation for performance is one of the most common types of action
rendered in reliance upon oral agreements that do not comply with the Statute
of Frauds. Preparatory reliance action may occur where the plaintiff's
promise was (1) to sell goods, or (2) to render services which required him
to move to a new location where the oral agreement was to be performed or
(3) to make improvements upon real property. The cases involving reliance
action in preparation for performance will be discussed in the order listed,
an arrangement that will facilitate a comparison of these preparatory reliance
cases with the performance cases involving goods, services and improvements
which were discussed in Part I of this article.
The defendant in the preparatory reliance cases, like one who hires an
independent contractor, has indicated by the nature of his request and promise
of return performance embodied in the oral agreement that he is promising
to compensate the plaintiff only for the final result, not for the various acts
of preparation leading up to that result."" But it frequently was essential for
112. Ames, Assumpsit for Use am4 Occupation, 2 HARV. L. Rv. 377 (1889). Also
see WOODWARD, QUASI CONTRACTS § 284 (1913).
113. Smith v. Wooding, 20 Ala. 324 (1852); Patterson v. Stoddard, 47 Me. 355
(1860) ; Harkness v. McIntire, 76 Me. 201 (1884) ; Pierce v. Pierce, 25 Barb. 243 (N. Y.
1857) ; cf. Gould v. Thompson, 4 Metc. 224 (Mass. 1842) (land owner recovered for use
and occupation until fire destroyed buildings on the property he had orally agreed to sell
to the defendant). WOODWARD, QUASI CONTRACTS 152 (1913).
114. Williams v. Williams, 210 Ala. 372, 98 So. 200 (1923) ; Collins v. Thayer, 74
Ill. 138 (1874) (use and occupation was set off against vendee's claim for money paid) ;
McCracken v. Sanders, 4 Bibb 511 (Ky. 1817); Fox's Heirs v. Longly, 1 A. K. Marsh.
388 (Ky. 1818) ; McCampbell v. McCampbell, 5 Litt. 92 (Ky. 1824) ; Grimes v. Shrieve,
6 T. B. Mon. 546 (Ky. 1828); Caldwell v. Davidson, 187 Ky. 490, 219 S. W. 445 (1920);
Zanone v. Tashgian, 231 Ky. 454, 21 S. W.2d 825 (1929) ; Richards v. Allen, 17 Me. 296
(1840) ; Parkhurst v. Van Courtland, 1 Johns. Ch. 273 (N. Y. 1814) ; Albea v. Griffin, 22
N. C. 9 (1838) ; Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Cordon, 208 N. C. 723, 182 S. E. 496
(1935) ; Bender's Adm'r v. Bender, 37 Pa. St. 419 (1860) ; Harris v. Harris, 70 Pa. St.
170 (1871) ; Holthouse v. Rynd, 155 Pa. St. 43, 25 Atl. 760 (1893) ; Treece v. Treece,
73 Tenn. 220 (1880) ; Schneider v. Reed, 123 Wis. 488, 101 N. W. 682 (1904).
115. In McHolland v. Treadway, 226 Mo. App. 212, 45 S. W.2d 903 (1932), for ex-
ample, the plaintiff entered into an oral agreement whereby he was to assign certain notes
to the defendant as partial payment for a designated tract of land owned by the latter.
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the plaintiff to render reliance action in preparation for performance, for
if he did not, he would later become in default under the terms of the oral
agreement. In many of these instances, the plaintiff intended to retain the
benefit from his reliance action only until the preparation had proceeded far
enough to enable him to perform the oral agreement. In other words, the
plaintiff ordinarily renders the preparatory reliance action in ultimate
expectation of return performance by the defendant. From the standpoint of
the ultimate expectation, therefore, it is arguable that the plaintiff's claim
for compensation for rendering preparatory action in reliance is more meritor-
ious than his claim for making improvements in reliance.," But again we
find that the expectation of the plaintiff is not the controlling factor; for the
decisions are generally less favorable to the plaintiff in the preparatory rdliance
cases, than in the improvement cases, because in the former the defendant is
not deemed to have received a legal benefit.
In the cases of preparatory reliance, the defendant's repudiation of the
oral agreement has the effect of preventing a benefit from being conferred
upon the defendant. The rules regarding the passage of title were employed in
the reliance improvement cases" 7 to show the existence of a legal benefit
because of the enlargement of the defendant's estate. The same argument
is turned around, in the preparatory reliance cases, to establish that since
no title passed to the defendant, his estate has not been enlarged and, there-
fore, he has not been legally benefited.
15. RELIANCE ACTION AS BENEFIT-PLAINTIFF
PREPARED TO PERFORM IN GOODS CASES
The leading case of Dowling v. McKenney"I involved reliance action by
the plaintiff in preparing goods for sale and delivery to the defendant under
an oral agreement which did not comply with the Statute of Frauds. In that
case the plaintiff orally agreed to deliver an inscribed monument, when com-
pleted, and to pay two hundred dollars, in return for which the defendant was
to convey a tract of land. After the monument was finished, the plaintiff
offered to deliver it to the defendant together with the balance of money due
in accordance with the oral agreement. The defendant refused to accept either
The notes had been executed by the defendant's father and, at the time when the oral
agreement was formed, they were held by third parties. After the plaintiff purchased
the notes from the third parties, but before he assigned them to the defendant, the latter
repudiated the unenforceable agreement. The plaintiff sought a lien against the de-
fendant's land for the amount he had paid for the notes. It was held that the lower
court correctly sustained a demurrer to the plaintiff's evidence because the proof showed
no actual payment to the defendant for which a lien could be imposed. In other words,
the plaintiff, by obtaining the notes from the third parties, was merely rendering prepara-
tory reliance action which did not constitute a legal benefit to the defendant.
116. See p. 27 supra.
117. See p. 28 supra.
118. 124 Mass. 478 (1878).
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the monument or the money or to convey the land. The plaintiff sued for the
value of the monument or the labor he had expended in making it. By the
consent of the parties, before verdict, the trial .judge reported the case for
the determination of the upper court. In holding that the case should stand
for trial, the upper court said:
In the case at bar, the defendant received no benefit from the labor
performed in completing the monument, although the plaintiff may
have suffered a loss because he is unable to enforce his contract,
... . But this rule does not apply to the item for services per-
formed by the plaintiff in preparing the land and foundation. If
this refers to the lot of the defendant where the monument was to
stand, and the work was done upon it, we cannot say as a matter of
law that it was not of benefit to the defendant. . . ."I
If the work regarding the foundation was requested by the defendant,
it would constitute partial performance of the oral agreement and the plaintiff
would be entitled to restitution therefor. 12' But, even in the absence of a
request by the defendant, the preparation of the foundation upon the de-
fendant's land might constitute a legal benefit in regard to reliance improve-
ments. 2 For the title to the foundation presumably passed to the defendant
as it was affixed to his land.
On the other hand, it seems evident that the title to the monument in the
Dowling case did not pass to the defendant. Since the plaintiff still retained
title to the monument, the pecuniary value of the defendant's estate could not
have been increased by reason of the plaintiff's reliance action. The de-
fendant did not request the reliance action which the plaintiff rendered, so it
is not shown that the defendant wanted it or was willing to diminish the
pecuniary value of his estate in order to obtain such reliance action from
anyone else. Thus, no legal benefit was conferred upon the defendant, and
restitution could not be allowed in regard to the monument. Other cases
involving similar facts are in accord with this result.12
119. Id. at 481.
120. See p. 18 stepra.
121. See p. 27 supra.
122. In Butler v. Shehan, 61 Ill. App. 561 (1895), the defendant orally agreed to
purchase a mare colt when four months old, if one should result from breeding the
plaintiff's mare to a certain stallion. Upon the happening of this contingency, the mare
colt was tendered to the defendant. In refusing to accept or pay for the colt, the defend-
ant contended that the oral agreement could not be enforced because of the one year pro-
vision of the Statute of Frauds. The defendant also argued that there could be no re-
covery in restitution because the property in the colt had not passed to the defendant and,
therefore, he had not been legally benefited. The upper court agreed with the defendant's
contentions. In Banker v. Henderson, 58 N. J. L. 26, 32 Atl. 700 (1895), a similar result
was reached. The oral agreement in that case required the plaintiff to furnish to the
defendant a boiler, engine, saw, and wood chopper in return for the defendant's oral
promise to pay four hundred fifty dollars. The saw and wood chopper were not yet
built, but all of the articles were to be used together and the one price covered the entire
group of articles. The plaintiff made the wood chopper and tendered all of the articles
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These decisions should be distinguished from cases like Kearns v.
Andree,2 3 however, where the plaintiff rendered his land less salable by adapt-
ing it, at the defendant's request, to meet the latter's peculiar desire. Since the
plaintiff's services in the Kearns case were rendered in response to the
defendant's request and promise of return performance, they saved him
from paying someone else for doing what the plaintiff did. Thus the plaintiff
was seeking restitution for his partial performance of the unenforceable agree-
ment in the Kearns case, and the court was correct in finding that the de-
fendant had been legally benefited. 2
16. RELIANCE ACTION AS BENEFIT-PLAINTIFF
PREPARED TO PERFORM IN SERVICE CASES
In Boone v. Coe12 5 the plaintiff rendered preparatory action in reliance
upon an oral agreement that did not comply with the Statute of Frauds. The
following allegations appeared in the plaintiff's petition:
Defendant agreed that if plaintiffs would leave their said homes and
businesses in IEentucky, and with their families, horses and wagons,
move to defendant's farm in Texas, and take charge of, manage and
to the defendant who refused to accept or pay for them, insisting that the oral agreement
did not comply with the goods provision of the Statute of Frauds. In reversing the lower
court's judgment for the plaintiff, the appellate court said: "Had this wood chopper
been delivered, or had work been done upon the defendant's ground by which some benefit
accrued to defendant's property, the case would present a different aspect, for then the
value of such work or materials to the defendant would be recoverable. But, in this case,
as in the preceding (Dowling case), the title to the completed artidles remaining in the
plaintiff, no benefit whatever accrued to the defendant." Id. at 701. In Mitchell Camera
Corp. v. Fox Film Corp., 8 Cal.2d 12, 59 P.2d 127 (1936), 35 Micna. L. REv. 847 (1937),
the oral agreement required the plaintiff to deliver to the defendant cameras of the type
which the plaintiff was manufacturing in the ordinary course of its business. Before per-
formance by the plaintiff, the defendant repuditaed this unenforceable agreement which
exceeded the monetary limit in the goods provision of the Statute of Frauds. The plain-
tiff then sued for the work and labor expended in manufacturing cameras in reliance upon
the oral agreement and in preparation for the performance of it. The lower court granted
the defendant's motion for a non-suit. In affirming this ruling, the upper court said,
"There is absolutely no evidence of the acceptance or retention of the benefits by the de-
fendant." Id. at 130. On a rehearing, however, the granting of the non-suit was reversed
because the court felt that there was sufficient evidence the defendant had furnished the
specifications for these cameras. If it were proved that this oral agreement involved
specially made cameras, of course, the goods provision of the Statute of Frauds would
not be applicable, and the plaintiff would be able to recover for the loss sustained by reason
of his disappointed expectations on the contract.
123. 107 Conn. 181, 139 AtI. 695 (1928), 26 MicH. L. REv. 942. Also see Fuller and
Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L. J. 52, 394-396 (1936).
124. See p. 25 supra.
125. 153 Ky. 233, 154 S. W. 900 (1913). This case overruled McDaniel v. Hutcher-
son, 136 Ky. 412, 124 S. W. 384 (1910). In the McDaniel case the plaintiff moved from
Illinois to Kentucky to live with and care for the defendant in return for the defendant's
oral promise to convey certain land to the plaintiff. After the moving had taken place,
but before the plaintiff had started to work for the defendant, the latter repudiated
the oral agreement. The plaintiff sought to recover for the loss he sustained in relying
upon the oral agreement. The lower court sustained a demurrer to the plaintiff's petition,
but this ruling was reversed upon appeal.
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cultivate same in wheat, corn and cotton for the twelve months next
following plaintiff's arrival at said farm, the defendant would have
a dwelling completed on said farm and ready for occupancy upon
their arrival, which dwelling plaintiffs would occupy as a residence
during the period of said tenancy. . . . Plaintiffs were to cultivate
certain portions of the farm and were to receive certain portions of
the crops raised ..... .126
The plaintiff alleged further that after he had expended $1,387.80 in moving
from Kentucky to Texas, the defendant repudiated the oral agreement. The
lower court sustained the defendant's demurrer to the petition, and that ruling
was affirmed on appeal.
If the plaintiff brought this suit, as the court said, "to recover certain
damages alleged to have resulted from the defendant's breach of a parol
contract of lease for one year to commence at a future date, ' 127 and the
Statute of Frauds was properly raised,'2 8 the decision of the court is certainly
correct, even though the plaintiff could have sued for restitution. But the
facts of the Boone case might present, and the court devotes most of its
discussion to, the problem of whether or not the plaintiff should be entitled
to restitution. If the plaintiff sought restitution, it may be argued from the
language of the petition, quoted above, that since the "defendant agreed if the
plaintiffs would leave their said homes . . .," the plaintiff's moving was done
at the defendant's request and constituted partial performance rather than re-
liance action in preparation for performance of the oral agreement.129 If that
were true, the plaintiff would not have to maintain a suit for breach of the oral
agreement that did not comply with the Statute of Frauds. Rather, he could
obtain restitution for his partial performance of the oral agreement under the
principles discussed in Part I of this article.'
Although the parties in the Boone case perhaps contemplated the plain-
tiff's moving from Kentucky to Texas, it is probable that they regarded the
farming to be done by the plaintiff as the primary object of the oral agreement.
Apparently the court was of the opinion that the plaintiff's moving merely
constituted preparation for performance, and was rendered in reliance upon
the oral agreement, rather than in performance of it. In this connection the
court said:
126. Boone v. Coe, 153 Ky. 233, 234, 154 S. W. 900, 901 (1913).
127. Ibid.
128. As a general rule, the Statute of Frauds must be affirmatively pleaded and can-
not be raised by demurrer. CLARK, CODE PLEADING 523 (2nd ed. 1947) ; 2 WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS 1518-1520 (rev. ed. 1936).
129. In Foley & Whitehill v. Texas Co., 252 S. W. 566 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923), the
plaintiff moved certain oil drilling machinery to a designated location where he was to
operate it for longer than one year, and the court interpreted the moving as a separate
contract to which the Statute of Frauds was not applicable.
130. See p. 14 supra.
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. . . The plaintiffs merely sustained a loss. Defendant received no
benefit. . . . To require him to pay plaintiffs for losses and ex-
penses incurred on the faith of the contract without any benefit
accruing to him would, in effect, uphold a contract upon which the
statute expressly declares no action shall be brought. 131
If the plaintiff's moving merely constituted preparatory reliance action, as
the italicized language above indicates, it would be practically impossible for
the plaintiff to establish that a legal benefit had been conferred upon the
defendant. The rules concerning the passage of title, which aided the plaintiff
in showing a legal benefit in the reliance improvement cases, are no more
helpful to the plaintiffs in the Boone case than they were in regard to the
reliance action in the goods cases. In fact, it could be argued that Boone v.
Coe 1 -3 2 presents a weaker case for restitution than was presented by the goods
cases involving preparatory reliance action. In the goods cases, it will be
recalled, the plaintiff intended that the benefit of his reliance action should
pass to the defendant as soon as it had proceeded far enough to become per-
formance of the oral agreement. Thus, the defendant's promise of return
performance in the goods cases was expected by the plaintiff as compensa-
tion for the very reliance action he was rendering. On the other hand, the
essential preparatory reliance in the Boone case was not rendered in expecta-
tion of anything from the defendant as compensation therefor. Although the
plaintiff in the Boone case suffered a loss, he did not legally benefit the
defendant, and nothwithstanding the disappointed expectations of the plain-
tiff, no recovery should be allowed on principles of restitution.
17. RELIANCE ACTION AS BENEFIT-PLAINTIFF
PREPARED TO PERFORM IN IMPROVEMENT CASES
The preparatory reliance action by the plaintiff in the case of McCrowell
v. Burson' 33 apparently was found to constitute a legal benefit. -In that case
the plaintiff agreed to build two storehouses for the defendant land owner in
return for which the latter promised to pay sixteen hundred dollars in goods,
money, and land. In reliance upon this agreement, which did not comply with
the land provision of the Statute of Frauds, the plaintiff assembled men and
materials and incurred considerable expense while preparing to build the
storehouses. The defendant refused to permit the plaintiff to begin the
actual performance of the agreement. The plaintiff then filed a declaration in
assumpsit, containing the common counts for work and materials furnished at
the defendant's request, and a count on the special contract. In a special ver-
dict, the jury found that the parties had entered into this written but unsigned
131. Boone v. Coe, 153 Ky. 233, 239, 154 S. W. 900, 903 (1913).
132. Ibid.
133. 79 Va. 290 (1884).
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contract, that it had been repudiated by the defendant, and that the plaintiff
had suffered $242.25 by reason of the transaction. The lower court held,
however, that the law was in favor of the defendant. In reversing this
judgment and remanding the case for a new trial, the appellate court said:
Can it be possible that the defendant in error can shirk his responsi-
bility by saying he promised to pay for the work done, partly in real
estate, and the promise not being in writing, he is sheltered by the
statute of frauds; can disappoint and damage the other party at will
and employ another to do his work? If so, then it is a most glaring
instance of a right without a remedy, a wrong done by one without
the possibility of redress for the party injured. Such is not the law. 3
From this language one might infer that the defendant should be estopped
from relying upon the Statuite of Frauds, in which case the recovery would
be based upon the contract itself. But the court negated this conclusion, for
it said:
Here, however, the contract assailed, as within the statute of frauds,
is not sought to be enforced, but is a matter collateral to the matter in
suit.135
Thus the recovery must have been based upon the common count for work
and labor.
Although the court asserted that to allow the defendant to avoid liability
in the McCrowell case "is not the law," no case was cited in support of its
statement. The court did refer to Chitty,13 but that author was concerned
with partial performance rather than preparatory reliance action. If the
plaintiff's materials in the McCrowell case had been sufficiently attached to
the defendant's land, so as to be regarded as a part thereof, they would then
constitute partial performance of the agreement,ls3 the defendant would be
legally benefitted, and a recovery should have been allowed. But the facts
of the McCrowell case reveal that the plaintiff merely prepared to perform and
bad not added materials or labor to the defendant's land. Indeed, the de-
fendant's repudiation of the agreement prevented any actual performance by
the plaintiff. Therefore, it would seem that the court, in allowing the plain-
tiff to recover in restitution, overlooked the vital distinction between partial
performance, discussed in Part I of this article, and preparatory reliance action
which was involved in the instant case. Despite its eloquence, the court de-
cided the case erroneously.
134. Id. at 303-304.
135. Id. at 303.
136. Id. at 304, the court said: "In 1 Chitty on Contracts, 421, it is said: 'So, if a
party fell' and removed timber, or take away a growing crop, under a void parol contract,
he becomes liable, on a new implied (in law) contract, as for goods sold, although he
could not have sued on the original contract.'" (Italics added.)
137. See p. 19 supra.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS
The McCrowell decision should be compared with the case of Cocheco
Aqueduct Association v. Boston and Maine R. R. 138 where a somewhat similar
type of preparatory reliance action was held not to constitute a legal benefit.
The oral agreement in that case provided that the defendant was to receive
from the plaintiff a certain quantity of water daily for a period of ten years.
After the agreement was formed, an agent of the defendant requested the
plaintiff to commence work on the aqueduct which the plaintiff was planning
to install for the purpose of supplying water in accordance with the terms of
the oral agreement. The plaintiff had purchased a right of way for the
aqueduct and laid about a half mile of pipe toward the roundhouse, where
the water was to be delivered, before the defendant repudiated the oral agree-
ment. The plaintiff then sued in assumpsit on the common count for work
and labor. The lower court refused the defendant's request for a non-suit and
charged the jury as follows:
If the plaintiffs performed the labor and furnished materials at the
request of the defendants, or in pursuance of the contract which they
were prevented from completing through the fault of the defendants,
the plaintiffs could recover as damages the expense of the labor and
materials less the value of the aqueduct, although the defendant had
received no benefit.D
Although this statement of the law would prabably have been upheld in the
McCrowell case, in the instant case the verdict for the plaintiff was set aside
on appeal.
The plaintiff might have argued that he expended the labor and materials
on the aqueduct in response to an express request by the defendant's agent
which in effect extended the scope of the prior oral agreement between the
parties. If this were true, the Cocheco case would resemble the Kearns case, 40
and the plaintiff would be seeking restitution for partial performance of the
oral agreement rather than for mere preparatory reliance action. In rejecting
such a view of the subsequent request by the defendant's agent in the Cocheco
case, the court said:
It was not in effect a request to construct an aqueduct. It was a
request in regard to the time when the plaintiffs should construct the
aqueduct, which, before the request was made, they intended to
construct. It was merely a request that the plaintiff should get ready
to perform the water contract by a certain day.Y4'
Although the language of the court is not too convincing, it is probably true,
as in the service cases involving preparatory reliance, ' 4 2 that the principal
object of the agreement was to obtain water over a period of years, not the
138. 59 N. H. 312 (1879).
139. Id. at 312-313.
140. See pp. 25, 26 supra.
141. 59 N. H. 312, 314 (1879).
142. See pp. 33, 34 supra.
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means the plaintiff would employ in performing the agreement. In any
event, there is room for considerable judicial discretion in the interpretation
of the agreement in order to determine what constitutes performance as
distinguished from mere reliance action. Once it is determined that the plain-
tiff has merely rendered reliance action, the conclusion of the court, and the
following language in justification thereof, is unassailable:
They (the defendants) do not own it (the aqueduct), and it has not
stjpplied them with water. The aqueduct was built by the plaintiffs
for their own use. They own it now, and they would have owned it if
they had completed it. Iaving received no benefit from the aqueduct.
the defendants are not liable, although the plaintiffs may suffer be-
cause unable to enforce the water contract. Dowling v. McKenney,
124 Mass. 481. Moreover, the aqueduct was not constructed in per-
formance of the contract, which was only for the delivery of a certain
quantity of water daily.
143
The preparatory reliance involved in the case of Santoro v. Mack14 1 pre-
sent a weaker case for the plaintiff than was involved in either the 1licCrowell
or the Cocheco decision. The plaintiff in the Santoro case orally agreed to pur-
chase a certain tract of land from the defendant, who orally agreed to sell and
convey. In reliance upon this oral agreement, the plaintiff expended consider-
able money in securing estimates for wiring, architectural plans, negotiations
for a loan, and for the resale of the property to another at a profit. The
defendant then repudiated the oral agreement, and the plaintiff sought com-
pensation for the above mentioned items. The upper court held that the
defendant's demurrer to the plaintiff's complaint was properly sustained.
In distinguishing the principal case from Kearns v. Andree,1 4 5 which was
decided by the same judges in the previous year, the court said:
In the present case it is not alleged, and does not appear, that any of
the acts we are considering were performed at the request, or with the
knowledge or acquiescence, of the defendant Mack. They conferred
no benefit upon her, nor did they benefit the property; nor has their
performance in any way enriched the defendant. On the contrary,
they were purely voluntary undertakings, such as well might have
been made before obtaining any agreements from the defendant
Mack. They were obviously made by the plaintiff in the belief that.
if the conveyance were later obtained, they would result in a profit
to him. As such, they clearly fall outside that class of expenditures
for which recovery can be obtained under the principles alluded to.
(i.e. restitution) .14
143. 59 N. H. 312, 313 (1879).
144. 108 Conn. 683, 145 Atl. 273 (1929).
145. 107 Conn. 181, 139 Atl. 695 (1928) ; also see Note, 26 MicH. L. REV. 942 (1928).
146. Santoro v. Mack, 108 Conn. 683, 696, 145 Atl. 273, 278 (1929). In Leavitt v.
Stern, 159 Ili. 526, 42 N. E. 869 (1896), the action was for rent due from the defendant
under a sealed lease of the plaintiff's theater. The defendant offered to prove, in defense,
that before the expiration of the sealed lease, the parties had orally agreed to replace it
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Although the court suggested that the harsh results sometimes produced
by the Statute of Frauds in the cases involving preparatory reliance action
might possibly be alleviated on some other theory of liability, 147 it correctly
recognized the limits of restitution, and that even restitution is not a panacea
for all the "tough luck" cases.
18. CONCLUSIONS
Although the Statute of Frauds is usually interpreted so as to prevent
actions for breach of the unenforceable agreement, it does not bar actions
based upon the restitution interest. Restitution under the Statute of Frauds
may be allowed if the defaulting defendant is unjustly retaining a legal
benefit. What constitutes a legal benefit varies in different situations, but
like the term of value in economics, it is believed to be based upon the principle
of satisfaction of human wants. Since a legal benefit must be expressed in
the pecuniary terms of a restitution judgment, however, it is necessary to
prove objectively in terms of money that the desires of the particular defendant
were satisfied. Such an objective manifestation may be established by showing
that the defendant received from the plaintiff, money, or items such as goods
or land, that he can exchange for money. Such items would increase his
power to obtain the things that would satisfy his individual wants. If the
items are not readily marketable, but the plaintiff parted with them in per-
formance of the oral agreement, the defendant's request and promise of return
with a six year lease, and that in reliance upon the longer oral lease the defendant had
executed contracts with European artists, purchased scenery and wardrobes, put in electric
fans, new chairs, carpets, and contracted for other decorations, totaling nearly $10,000.
The plaintiff then repudiated the oral six year lease. The lower court excluded the
defendant's testimony and directed the jury to find for the plaintiff. This ruling was
affirmed upon appeal. The court spoke of the defendant's reliance action as follows:
"In the case at bar there was no offer to prove that any improvements had been made
on the leased premises, any services rendered or any money paid out in pursuance of the
oral contract for which appellant (defendant) would have a right to recover at law. The
expenditure of $1,500 for an electric fan would not come within the rule, for it was not
shown to have been put in at the request of appellee or in pursuance of the contract, or
that it became attached to the building as part thereof, so as to become the property of the
appellee. The same may be said of the expenditures for scenery, etc. Appellant did
not offer to prove that he had decorated the building or incurred any expense therein,
but only that he had become obligated to another on a contract to have the same done. It
did not appear from any testimony offered, that any of the expenditures which the ap-
pellant sought to have set off against the rent were provided for by the verbal contract.
Clearly, appellant could not recover moneys which he had voluntarily expended in the
purchase of personal property for his own benefit, and which the contract on which he
claims to have relied did not require him to purchase, even although he would not have
purchased it had no such contract been made." Id. at 533.
147. In Santoro v. Mack, 108 Conn. 683, 696, 145 Atl. 273, 278 (1929), the court said,
"It is conceivable that under certain circumstances of deceit, misrepresentation, or fraud
which induced the making of the expenditures, a recovery might be had, but manifestly
this complaint takes no such ground." Also see Welch v. Lawson, 32 Miss. 170 (1856),
wherein the plaintiff's recovery was based upon the defendant's deceit. As to the rule
applied in some states, that the plaintiff can recover on the contract because his change of
position in reliance upon the oral agreement estops the defendant from pleading the
Statute of Frauds, see Seymour v. Oelrichs, 156 Cal. 782, 106 Pac. 88 (1909).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
performance demonstrates that he wanted those items and was willing to
pay for them. Further, the defendant's acts in accepting, retaining, or con-
suming the plaintiff's partial performance, after the formation of the unen-
forceable agreement, furnishes additional evidence that his desires were
thereby satisfied. Since the plaintiff's performance of the oral agreement
saved the defendant from paying another for such items, the courts have
found that this saving from a pecuniary diminution, at the defendant's request,
constitutes a legal benefit. If the plaintiff's performance of the unenforceable
agreement was rendered to a third party or was of a less tangible or non-
returnable type, such as services or the use of land, the courts are more apt to
emphasize the defendant's request and his promise of return performance as a
means of showing that he got what he wanted. Again, if the plaintiff's
premises remain unoccupied or are rendered less valuable in accordance with
the terms of the oral agreement, the defendant's request and return promise
usually provide the sole justification for finding that his desires were satisfied
and that he was thereby legally benefited.
If the plaintiff merely acted in reliance upon the unenforceable agreement,
rather than in performance of it, his acts were not done in response to the
defendant's request or promise of return performance. Thus, it must be
shown by some other type of objective manifestation that the desires of the
defendant were satisfied by the reliance action or it cannot constitute a legal
benefit. In the reliance cases involving improvements and the use of land,
a legal benefit was found in the resulting pecuniary enhancement of the
defendant's estate. But the plaintiff's reliance action in preparation for per-
formance of the oral agreement did not enhance the monetary value of the
defendant's estate, and restitution was generally denied. It may be that the
plaintiff suffered a loss by reason of his preparatory reliance action which
cannot be shifted to the defaulting defendant on any other theory of liability,
but it is submitted that the harshness of a particular result produced by the
Statute of Frauds does not justify dispensing with the requirement of a legal
benefit in suits for restitution.
